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A transgendered woman,' who has undergone extensive hormonal
therapy and cosmetic surgery, is convicted and imprisoned. Because
1. 'Transgendered' is a term that includes all people who consider themselves to be of a
different sex than their assigned birth or genetic sex. 'Transgendered' has largely re-
placed 'transsexual' within the community due to its fluidity and lack of emphasis on
the operation often referred to as a 'sex change.' See Katherine M. Franke, The Cen-
tral Mistake ofSex Discrimination Law: The Disaggregation of Sexfrom Gender, 144 U.
PA. L. REv. 1, 32-33 n.130 (1995); GORDENE OLGA MACKENZIE, TRANSGENDER
NATION 55-56 (1994). Transgendered women and men are people whose current sex
identity does not match that into which they were born or were assigned at birth.
The terms "pre-operative" and "post-operative" refer to genital transformation sur-
gery. In describing transgendered people, I will follow the wide use of 'transgendered
woman' to indicate someone who is at some stage of transition toward becoming a
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she still has a penis, albeit a nonfunctioning one, prison officials cate-
gorize her as a male, and place her in a men's prison. "You were born
a boy, and you're going to stay a boy," the prison doctor says,2 reject-
ing continuation of her long-term estrogen treatment. Her body
begins to regain the masculinity she had largely escaped. Bruised by
the changes,3 her body no longer feels like her own, but one imposed
on her by the criminal justice system. Her femininity stands out
among the male prisoners who repeatedly rape and beat her.
Trapped,4 not only in her body, but in a prison that refuses to recog-
nize and respect her gender identity, she castrates herself with glass6
and used razors. The prison hospital's hands forced, it finishes the
job. Then, to compensate for the lost masculinity, the doctor orders
testosterone replacement treatments. After this fails to restore her
masculinity, the prison doctors return her to the estrogen treatments
that preceded her incarceration.
woman, and 'transgendered man' to indicate someone 'transitioning' toward be-
coming a man.
2. Ann Sweeney, Gannett News Service, June 1, 1989 available in 1989 WL 4846119
(quoting Dr. Darryl Opicka).
3. Bruising and nausea are common results of withdrawal of estrogen treatment. See,
e.g., Sweeney, supra note 2.
4. Transgendered people commonly speak of their situation as being "trapped in the
wrong body," a prison metaphor that reflects the doubly incarcerated nature of trans-
gendered prisoners' experiences. See, e.g., Inmate's Transsexual Suit Tossed, OmAHA
WORLD HERALD, Mar. 8, 1994, at 18 (stating that Keith Smith, who prefers to be
called Andrea Stevens, claims to be a "woman trapped in a man's body"). However
transgendered writer and activist Kate Bornstein criticizes this hackneyed phrase as
inaccurate: "I understand that many people may explain their pre-operative transgen-
dered lives in this way, but I'll bet that it's more likely an unfortunate metaphor that
conveniently conforms to cultural expectations, rather than an honest reflection of
our transgendered feelings." KATE BORNSTEIN, GENDER OUTLAw 66 (1994).
5. "Gender" and "sex" have distinct meanings: "gender" denotes identity and traits
related to sex, including the "masculine" and the "feminine." Katherine Franke
makes the distinction that "[s]ex is regarded as a product of nature, while gender is
understood as a function of culture." Franke, supra note 1, at 1. The vast majority of
what is understood as an indicator of sex really refers to gender. See Franke, supra
note 1, at 2. Because I subscribe to Franke's analysis of gender and sex, I will almost
exclusively use "gender," a term that reflects the predominance of nonbiological
components in one's "sex" identity.
6. Cf Telephone Interview with Dee Farmer (Aug. 5, 1997)[hereinafter Farmer Inter-
view]; Douglas K. Smith, Transsexualism, Sex Reassignment Surgery and the Law, 56
CORNELL L. REv. 963, 972 (1971)(quoting a 1945 Swiss court opinion referring to
genital self-mutilation by a transgendered person); Frank Green, 'Woman' Inmate
Hates Man's Body: Officials Deny Request for Estrogen Treatment, RICHMOND TIMES
DIsPATCH, July 20, 1997, at C6 (discussing Michelle Stokes' repeated self mutilation,
including genital mutilation, as a result of denial of estrogen treatments).
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Shockingly, several transgendered women have experienced simi-
lar ordeals.7 This Article will examine this human rights tragedy and
explore its vital relevance.8 Many transgendered prisoners have HIV,
are people of color, are lesbian, gay, or bisexual, and/or are incarcer-
ated for property crimes or prostitution related to their quest for
transformation. Their condition demonstrates flaws both multiple and
fundamental in the hierarchization of gender, sexual orientation, race,
class, and deviance. Transgendered prisoners' position both behind
bars and at society's bottom rung crystallize such problems into an
array of intermingled and overwhelming legal dilemmas.
This Article first summarizes gender, transgendered identity, and
legal issues facing transgendered people to contextualize the lives of
transgendered prisoners. Parts II and III explore respectively the
placement and treatment issues that complicate the incarceration of
the transgendered. Corrections authorities, through indifference or
incompetence, foster a shockingly inhumane daily existence for trans-
gendered prisoners. In Part V, I examine the plight of transgendered
prisoners through the metaphor of the miners' canary.9 Transgendered
7. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 830 (1994); Supre v. Ricketts, 792 F.2d 958,
960 (10th Cir. 1986).
8. Three law review articles discuss transgendered prisoners. The first, Marjorie Rifldn,
Farmer v. Brennan: Spotlight on an Obvious Risk of Rape in A Hidden World, 26
COLUM. Hum. RTS. L. REv. 273, 275 (1995), centers on the situation of Dee
Farmer, whose case before the Supreme Court drew attention to the problem of
transgendered prisoners. The second, Debra Sherman Tedeschi, The Predicament of
the Transsexual Prisoner, 5 Txim'vE POL. & Crv. RTS. L. Rev. 27 (1995), deals with a
few prominent cases and briefly suggests solutions to the problems of transgendered
prisoners. The third, Anita C. Barnes, The Sexual Continuum: Transsexual Prisoners,
24 NEw ENG. J. ON GRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 599 (1998), discusses transsexual
housing and treatment issues, focusing on protective custody, and criticizes defini-
tions of sex used by prisons. This Article attempts to promote the liberal project of
addressing transgendered prisoners' needs by systematically examining all their prob-
lems and many new potential solutions. The Article also introduces three elements of
critical theoretical import of the mistreatment of transgendered prisoners. First, the
prison system's difficulty in accommodating transgendered prisoners lies in their ad-
herence to the gender binarism. Second, the experience of transgendered prisoners,
through the miner's canary metaphor, points toward the need for a rethinking of all
gender constructs. Third, the experience of transgendered prisoners demonstrates the
need for the establishment of gender rights. In contrast to the previous articles on this
topic, this Article does not focus exclusively on the liberal interpretation of transgen-
dered prisoners' issues, but instead delves into the theoretical issues raised by their
situation and identity.
9. Miners often placed canaries where they labored in order to gauge the toxicity of the
mine's gases. The bird's illness or death alerted miners to dangers in the mine. See
discussion infra Part VA
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prisoners signal the grave dangers facing all of us in a wide array of
social structures, elucidating the apparently intractable problems of
gender. ' This Article simultaneously explores a human rights tragedy
and proposes practical solutions while taking a critical perspective on
the issues raised.
I. GENDER, TRANsSEXUALTY AND TRANSGENDERISM
Transgendered identities challenge and provide new direction for
inquiry on gender, both advancing and interrogating the feminist cri-
tique of the construction of gender. The multiplicity of gender
disproves the notion of the male/female binarism. The phenomenon
of transsexuality has yielded to a transgender movement, made up of
diverse transgendered identities.
A. The Gender Spectrum
The rigid dichotomy of gender identity, what I call the gender
binarism, is inconsistent with fundamental biological and psychologi-
cal realities.
1. The Construction of Sex and the Reality of Gender
Sex, defined as "either of two divisions of organisms distin-
guished respectively as male or female," 2 does not exist. Although
most people accept that there are two sexes, "male" and "female,"
these categories actually contain a myriad of genders, formed geneti-
cally, biologically and culturally. 3 "Each of the so-called criteria of
sexedness is itself a continuum-including chromosomal variables,
10. The goal of this Article then is to draw lessons from the experiences of transgendered
prisoners through a dose look at their attempts to improve their lives. But see, Rim
.ANNE WILCHINS, READ My Lips: SEXUAL SUBVERSION AND THE END OF GENDER 22
(1997) [hereinafter WILCHINS, READ My Lips] (expressing skepticism about feminist
scholarship on transgendered people).
11. Indeed, this argument has been advanced by Marjorie Garber in her noted study of
transvestitism. See generally, MARJORIE GARBER, VSTED INTERESTS (1992).
12. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEw COLUGIATE DICnoNARY 1078 (1987).
13. See Anne Fausto-Sterling, The Five Sexes: Why Male and Female Are Not Enough, THE
SCIENcES, Mar./Apr. 1993, at 20-21.
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genital and gonadal variations, reproductive capacities, [and] endocri-
nological proportions." 14 Scientists generally agree that there are seven
gender traits that constitute one's gender identity: 1) Chromosomes;
2) Gonads; 3) Hormones; 4) Internal reproductive organs; 5) External
genitalia; 6) Secondary sexual characteristics; and 7) Self identity. ' 5
These seven variables classify the distinct elements of gender iden-
tity.1
6
The ubiquity of the categories "male" and "female" cannot prove
its veracity as the irreducible essence of gender. Such categories trun-
cate the diversity of gender identity.17 The psychological component
of "self identity" renders the simple male/female dichotomy useless.
From the football jock and the trucker to the fey hairdresser and the
cyber geek, from the tomboy to the cheerleader, this potpourri of
gender identity leaves the categories "male" and "female" wanting.
Given such diversity, some would go so far as to argue that there are
as many genders as there are people.'"
14. JOHN STOLTENBERG, REFUSING TO BE A MAN 28 (1989).
15. These factors are detailed by Douglas K. Smith. See Smith, supra note 6. Fifteen years
later, the New York Supreme Court of New York County used the exact formulation
cited above in Maffei v. Kolaeton Indus., Inc., 626 N.Y.S.2d 391 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1995) (holding that a pre-operative transgendered female was protected by New York
City's sex discrimination statute as a member of the class of males).
16. See Fausto-Sterling, supra note 13, at 21 (promoting the notion of multiple gender
factors).
17. This Article will not directly address the relevance of my theory of the gender bi-
narism to feminist theory. Rather, the multiplicity of gender conforms quite closely
to what I interpret as the spirit of contemporary anti-essentialist feminist theory. For
a fuller discussion of the relationship between transgender identity and feminist the-
ory, see Terry S. Kogan, Transsexuals and Critical Gender Theory: The Possibility of a
Restroom Labeled "Other', 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1223 (1997).
The purported difference between men and women is as alive as ever as demon-
strated by the popularity of John Gray's MEN ARE FROM MARS, WOMEN ARE FROM
VENUS. Such pop psychology may appear benign, but contributes to the compulsory
participation in the gender binarism. See Daniel P. Levison and Meredith S. Francis,
Compulsory Gendering: The Central Organizing Principle of Sex Discrimination Theory
and Practice 9 (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
18. See STOLTENBERG, supra note 14, at 28. The failure to recognize this diversity is a
particular failing of this culture. Cultures from Ancient Greece to India, as well as
various others around the world, recognized the existence of hermaphrodite, or inter-
sex, individuals and cross-gender identified individuals without forcing them into
either of the male or female genders. See LESLIE FEINBERG, TRANSGENDER WARRIORS
39-47 (1996).
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2. The Gender Binarism
The discrete categories of "male" and "female" did not always
control sexual identity.
Biological theories of sexuality, juridical conceptions of the
individual, forms of administrative control in modern na-
tions, led little by little to rejecting the idea of a mixture of
the two sexes in a single body, and consequently to limiting
the free choice of indeterminate individuals. Henceforth,
everybody was to have one and only one sex. Everybody was
to have his or her primary, profound, determined and de-
termining sexual identity; as for the elements of the other sex
that might appear, they could only be accidental, superficial,
or even quite simply illusory. 9
Presuming a natural and biological foundation of sexual difference,
the law obsessively assigns gender identity according to the gender
binarism. 2' Legal procedures around interpersonal relationships re-
quire the categorization of one's gender, sometimes quite explicitly
called a "sexual declaratory judgment hearing."2' For "inheritance,
legitimacy, paternity, succession to title, and eligibility for certain
professions to be determined, modern Anglo-Saxon legal systems re-
quire that newborns be registered as either male or female." 22 Legal
and societal processes assign a gender to individuals in a coercive
fashion that rewards conformity to the norm and punishes noncon-
formity.'
The gender binarism so tightly requires the attribution of gender
that the power of medicine is employed to transform intersex bodies
into categorizable ones: as a matter of course, babies born with an
"aberrant" mix of gender traits are quickly "repaired" to, at least
physically, comply with the "M" or the "F" box on a birth certificate.24
19. MICHEL FOUCAULT, HERCULINE BARBIN: BEING THE RECENTLY DISCOVERED MEM-
OIRS O A NINETEENTH CENTURY FRENCH HERMAPHRODITE Viii (1980).
20. See Franke, supra note 1, at 40.
21. See Franke, supra note 1, at 41.
22. Fausto-Sterling, supra note 13, at 23.
23. See Levison & Francis, supra note 17, at 8.
24. Identifying a baby's gender is the first entry into this gender binarism for most peo-
ple. See Smith, supra note 6, at 967 ("Doctors examine a newborn's external genitalia
and make the fateful determination that appears on official birth records.").
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This same medical power has also been summoned to physically
transform a person from one "sex" to the "other" when that person's
psychological gender identity diverges from the physical." Transgen-
dered people break the confines of the gender binarism to give voice
to the real breadth of gender identity.
B. Transsexuality and Transgenderism
Courts have defined 'transsexualism' as "a gender identity disor-
der," the sufferers of which believe that they are "cruelly imprisoned
within a body incompatible with their real gender identity."" For
transgendered prisoners, such "double imprisonment" requires that
they resort to medical arguments that reflect the established view of
transgenderism as a medical phenomenon. Such medical arguments
have proven persuasive.28 Doctors, psychiatrists, and researchers have
taken an active role in studying and advancing gender transformative
processes.29 The "illness" has been labelled gender dysphoria, 0 the
medical condition of psychological dissonance with one's physiologi-
cal gender. For example, Dee Farmer, plaintiff in Farmer v. Brennan,"
25. See MAcKENzIE, supra note 1, at 41.
26. Powell v. Schriver, 175 F.3d 107, 111 (2d Cir. 1999) (quoting Farmer v. Moritsugu,
163 F.3d 610, 611 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (quoting THE MERCK MANUAL OF MEDICAL
INFORMATION 418 (1997)).
27. See Hasan Shafiqullah, Shape-Shifters, Masqueraders, & Subversives: An Argument for
the Liberation of Transgendered Individuals, 8 HASTINGS WOMEN'S LJ. 195, 215-17
(1997) (discussing the difference between medical and legal determinations of gender
identity).
28. See, e.g., Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 829-31 (1994); Meriwether v. Faulkner,
821 F.2d 408, 410 (7th Cir. 1987).
29. For a strong critique of the medical establishment's work in male-to-female trans-
sexuality, see generally JANICE G. RAYMOND, THE TRANSSEXUAL EMPIRE: THE
MAKING OF THE SHE-MALE (1994). For an examination of female-to-male transsexu-
als, see generally LESLIE MARTIN LOTHSTEIN, FEMALE-To-MALE TRANSSEXUALISM:
HISTORICAL, CLINICAL AND THEORETICAL ISSUES (1983). For a social psychologist
perspective on transsexuality, see generally BRYAN TULLY, ACCOUNTING FOR TRANS-
SEXUALISM AND TRANSiHoMOsExUALT: THE GENDER IDENTITY CAREERS OF OVER
200 MEN AND WOMEN WHO HAvE PETITIONED FOR SURGICAL REASSIGNMENT OF
THEIR SEXUAL IDENTITY (1992). For a social and medical study, see generally DAvE
KING, THE TRANSVESTITE AND THE TRANSSEXUAL (1993).
30. See generally, ROBERT J. STOLLER, SEX AND GENDER (1968); 2 ROBERT J. STOLLER,
SEX AND GENDER: THE TRANSSEXUAL EXPERIMENT (1975); ROBERT J. STOLLER,
SPLITTING: A CASE OF FEMALE MASCULINITY (1973).
31. 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
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was described by Justice Souter as "a transsexual, one who has '[a] rare
psychiatric disorder [gender dysphorial in which a person feels persis-
tendy uncomfortable about his or her anatomical sex,' and who
typically seeks medical treatment, including hormonal therapy and
surgery, to bring about a permanent sex change."32 This relatively fac-
ile description of transsexuality retains wide currency despite the
complexity of transgenderism.
The predominant understanding in the transgendered commu-
nity is that transgendered identity is not a principally medical
condition, although physical and psychological treatments and thera-
pies can aid a transgendered person to arrive at a healthy gender
identity. Rather than finding a "cure" for gender dysphoria, a
healthy gender identity involves resolving the relationship among the
various factors constituting gender, not "fixing" the physical or the
psychological to meet the other. The use of the word 'transgender' in
place of 'transsexual' reflects this shift away from the historical pri-
macy of medical treatment,34 toward a growing awareness of the
psychological element of gender identity.
Initially, the word 'transgender' was used to describe people who
were neither crossdressers nor transsexuals-people whose gender
transformation was more than a change of clothes but not quite a
change of sex. 5 'Transgender' grew into a useful umbrella term, in-
cluding and not subordinating the proliferation of transgendered
people who avoid medical treatment. 'Transsexual' 36 refers to 'sex'
rather than 'gender,' a biological emphasis that excludes psychological
gender identity. 7 'Transgendered' recognizes the extrabiological na-
ture of gender.3
The shift to 'transgender' rather than 'transsexual' reflects some
hostility toward the medicalization of cross-gender identity. As one
commentator argues "[b]y buying into the medical model's treatment
32. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 829.
33. See Farmer v. Hawk-Sawyer, 69 F.Supp.2d 120, 122-23 (D.D.C. 1999).
34. See generally, MAcKENZIE, supra note 1, at 5-6.
35. See WILCHINS, PEAD My Lips, supra note 10, at 15-16.
36. The term 'transsexual' was first used by D.O. Cauldwell in Psychopathia Transexualis,
16 SEXOLOGY 274, 275 (1949), and was popularized in the widely-used text HENRY
BENJAMIN, THE TRANssExuAJL PHENOMENON (1966).
37. See BORNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 30-31.
38. See Mary Anne Case, Disaggregating Gender from Sex and Sexual Orientation: The
Effeminate Man in the Law and Feminist Jurisprudence, 105 YAL Lj. 1, 15-16
(1995).
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for transsexualism, transsexuals become dependent on medical care-
takers throughout their lives for hormones and surgical repairs to the
surgery that is offered as a panacea for their suffering."39 Others in-
quire more deeply into the meaning of gender itself, questioning
whether surgery is necessary to live life as the 'other' sex."
Although some post-operative transsexuals resent those who do
41
not undergo surgery, more transgendered people are recognizing the
right of individuals to define their own gender, regardless of the role of
medical treatment. Activists such as Leslie Feinberg and Kate Bornstein
argue for a transgender movement without regard to individual choices
about medical treatment. As Kate Bornstein, transgendered writer and
performer, states: "One answer to the question 'Who is a transsexual?'
might well be 'Anyone who admits it.' A more political answer might
be, 'Anyone whose performance of gender calls into question the con-
struct of gender itself.' "
42
C Categorizing Transgendered People
Transgendered people include all those whose gender identity
departs from the sex determined at birth.43 It includes those who
choose to alter their sex, either temporarily or permanently, through
cosmetic medical means. A 'transgendered person' is both a man who
occasionally wears women's clothes as well as a woman who, through
medical and surgical techniques, acquires male features. Such a broad
term includes a myriad of subcategories. No category can perfectly
define its members, yet this section attempts an approximate categori-
zation of transgendered people at different degrees of transformation.
39. Case, supra note 38, at 20.
40. See Dallas Denny, Gordene MacKenzie's Transgender Nation: A Commentary, 7
TwANsSisTaas: J. oF TA ssExuAI FEMINISM 44 (1995).
41. SeeBoRNSiEN, supra note 4, at 121.
42. BoRNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 121.
43. Interview with Rosalyne Blumenstein, PEoPLE WIT-I AIDS COAUTION NawsLErIER,
Apr. 1996, at 22; see also, BORNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 68-69 (oudining different
transgendered subcommunities and their negative regard for each other, including
post- and pre-operative transsexuals, transgenders, drag queens, transvestites and
closet case transvestites).
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1. The "Post-operative" Transgendered
]Post-operative transgendered people undergo a lengthy process to
convert from their initial sex to the "other sex." First, candidates for
,, . ,,44
sex reassignment undergo regular psychiatric counseling to deter-
mine if their gender dysphoria would be genuinely reduced by sex
reassignment surgery (SRS).45 The candidate then must live dressed as
her desired gender for one to two years in order to test the appropri-
ateness of SRS."6 During that period, many transgendered women
begin hormonal treatments and cosmetic surgery such as breast aug-
mentation, facial cosmetic surgery, and other procedures such as
electrolysis. The amalgam of these procedures generally refers to a
fully transformed, "post-operative" transgendered person. There are
several forms of SRS for men, the most common of which, vagino-
plasty, involves gutting and inverting the penis to create a vagina.47
Scrotal tissue is used to fashion a clitoris to complete this relatively
short and often successful operation.
41Transgendered males, who may comprise half of all transsexuals,
require phalloplasty, the surgical creation of a penis by clitoral en-
largement or rolling skin from another part of the body and attaching
it to the body "like a suitcase handle."4  The latter procedure has a
more attractive result but a far lower success rate. Both procedures are
far more expensive than vaginoplasty, and thus many more
44. The widely used term 'reassignment' indicates the degree to which medical terminol-
ogy dominates discourse concerning transsexuals. The reassignment presumably is
performed by the surgeon who fashions the new genitalia. Although I have seen the
word 'transformation' used in its place, 'reassignment' is still very much a current
term.
45. See, e.g., Christine Beatty, Toxic Thinking Part One: Elitism, 7 TRANsSisr Rs: THE J.
oF Ta~xssJxuAL FEMINISM 46, 47 (1995) (for use of the term).
46. See Smith, supra note 6, at 973 (describing the detailed procedure followed at the
Gender Identity Clinic at Johns Hopkins University); see also, Nick Cohen, The Rose-
Tinted Murderer, THE OBSERVER, Sept. 15, 1996, at 3 (describing the SRS process).
47. I rely on Kate Bornstein's description of SRS. Bornstein points out that one doctor
sometimes adds a bit of intestinal tubing to provide lubrication, although unlike a
vagina, the constructed vagina will lubricate regardless of sexual excitement. See
BoRNsrEIN, supra note 4, at 17.
48. The estimate of half seems common. See, e.g., BoRNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 16; Emily
Yoffe, Becoming a Man, DErAiis, Nov. 1994, at 56, 58. But see, RAYMOND, supra
note 29, at xiii (asserting that 85% of all transsexual surgery transforms men into
women, because "men, being freer to experiment than women, seek out and submit
to the surgery more often").
49. BORNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 16; Yoffe, supra note 48, at 60.
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transgendered males than transgendered females remain pre-operative
or non-operative.' °
2. Transgendered People in Transformation
Transgendered people in transformation includes two groups of
transgendered people: those who are moving toward SRS and those
who are moving toward or are at a level of transformation achieved
through medical intervention without SRS. The often-used term "pre-
operative" includes transgendered people who have begun the pre-
operative transformation, engaging in exclusive crossdressing, hormo-
nal therapy, and cosmetic and other surgery. Many pre-operative
transgendered people have undergone several operations except the
genital transformative one, making the term "pre-operative" a not very
accurate one.
Estrogen significantly feminizes men, softening facial and body
features, reducing body and facial hair growth, and shrinking and
disabling the penis.5 Testosterone treatment for transgendered men,
which leads to shrinkage of breasts, increased bodily and facial hair
growth, and clitoral enlargement, has not been deemed to be as medi-
cally safe as estrogen.52 Breast implantation and removal can also
achieve significant transformative effects. Procedures such as electroly-
sis speed the transformation. Ms. Farmer, the plaintiff in Farmer v.
Brennan, for example, is a pre-operative transsexual because she had
50. See MACKENZIE, supra note 1, at 20.
51. The extent to which a transgendered woman's penis is nonfunctioning varies from
partial or complete incapacity to become erect to shrinkage. Another related issue is
whether the transgendered woman still may ejaculate, and if so, whether reproduc-
tion may occur. This possibility arises in situations where transgendered women with
partially functioning penises are placed with other women who might be impreg-
nated through sexual contact with the transgendered woman. See Phillips v.
Michigan Dep't of Corrections, 731 F.Supp. 792, 794 n.4 (W.D. Mich. 1990);
BORNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 18; Telephone Interview with Dr. Audrey Compton,
Director of Corrections Health Programs at the Health and Hospitals Corporation of
New York City (uly 28, 1997) [hereinafter Compton Interview] (discussing sex be-
tween transgendered women and other women).
52. Testosterone treatments for transgendered males is considered by some to be more
experimental. The New York City corrections system requires transgendered prison-
ers to sign a waiver before they may receive treatments since the hormones have not
been approved for such use. See Compton Interview, supra note 51.
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silicone breast implants, regular hormonal treatments, but an unsuc-
cessful testicle-removal operation."
In addition to pre-operative transgendered people, transgendered
people in transformation also include men and women who have un-
dergone hormonal treatments and/or cosmetic surgery to modify their
bodies but do not plan to undergo SRS. 4 Many transgendered males
achieve a high degree of transformation without attempting SRS, rec-
ognizing the limits of current phalloplastic techniques. Mastectomies
and hysterectomies, for instance, erase some notable elements of a fe-
male body."
3. Untreated Transgendered People
Untreated transgendered people do not undergo genital surgery
or any other medical procedure to further their gender transforma-
tion. This group includes people who crossdress either exclusively or
infrequently. Transvestites, crossdressers, and drag kings and queens
regularly or irregularly present themselves as another gender. Others
deconstruct gender lines through their clothing and self-
presentation.56 Their largely impermanent transgendered identity may
not require medical accommodation by the prison system.
4. Lesbian and Gay Transgendered People
Some transgendered activists estimate that over forty percent of
transgendered people are lesbian, gay, or bisexual, a percentage four
times higher than that commonly assumed to exist in the broader
population.5 7 Often, the discrimination faced by transgendered people
53. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 825, 829 (1994).
54. Transgendered women who do not intend to undergo SRS face the gravest problems
in prison because they are classified by the prison system as men despite their femini-
zation.
55. See TRANSSI uJALIsM AND SEx REASSIGNMENT 113 (Michael Ross & William Walters
eds., 1986).
56. See Beatty, supra note 45, at 46-47.
57. The International Conference on Transgender Law and Employment Policy, Inc. has
performed a study which estimates the percentage of transgendered people who are
lesbian or gay to be 40% to 50% (study on file with author). The landmark study of
sexuality by Alfred Kinsey indicated that only a small percentage of transvestites are
homosexual. See ALFRED KINSEY ET AL., SEXUAL BEHAVIOR IN THE HuMAN FEMALe
680 (1953).
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evokes homophobia.5' One might presume then that for many the
subversion of traditional gender identities occurs alongside any veer-
ing from compulsory heterosexuality. Although no necessary
connection exists between transgendered and gay identities, the sepa-
ration of such phenomena for legal purposes cannot erase the reality
that many transgendered people are lesbian, gay, or bisexual."0 The
intersection of these identities forces transgendered people to confront
homophobia, often without the support of lesbian and gay communi-
ties that sometimes exclude transgendered perspectives from their
agenda. 6'
All transgendered people, from the fully transformed to those
who dabble in crossdressing, confront a wide range of legal and social
difficulties. The next section addresses these legal issues and argues for
a right to gender identity as a solution not only for transgendered
people in the free world, but for those in prison.
5. A Note Concerning Transgendered Men
Although transgendered men comprise about half of the trans-
gender population, case law generally addresses the concerns of
transgendered women. There is a concomitant skewing of scholarship
toward this group." Reasons for the lack of emphasis on transgen-
dered men include the fact that most gender clinics were directed at
transgendered women rather than men; that phalloplasty is a relatively
recent and expensive procedure compared with vaginoplasty; and per-
58. See Susan Etta Keller, Operations of Legal Rhetoric: Examining Transsexual and Judi-
cialldentity, 34 HARv. C.R-C.L. L. REv. 329, 375 (1999).
59. Compulsory heterosexuality is the term employed by Adrienne Rich to indicate the
mulifaceted face of heterosexual ideology and how it requires heterosexuality. See
Adrienne Rich, Compulsory Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence, in THE LEsBIAdN
AND GAY STUDIES READER 227, 228 (HenryAbelove et al. eds., 1993).
60. See Francisco Valdes, Queers, Sissies, Dykes, and Tomboys: Deconstructing the Confla-
tion of 'Sex, " "Gender, " and "Sexual Orientation" in Euro-American Law and Society,
83 CA.L. REv. 1 (1995).
61. See WILcmNs, READ MY Lips, supra note 10, at 44-45. Indeed, the proposed Em-
ployment Non-Discrimination Act (ENDA) excludes transgendered people, if for the
more prosaic reason that such inclusion would deprive ENDA of twenty votes in
Congress. See PAT CALiFIA, SEX CHANGES: THE POLITICS OF TRANSGENDERISM 240
(1997).
62. See David G. O'Brien, Jeldness v. Pierce: Will the Requirements of Title 1M 'Handcuff
Prison Administrators?, 22 Naw ENG. J. ON CrM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 73, 87-88
(1996).
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haps most importantly, that there is male bias in the perspectives of
researchers. Also, social pressures prevent women from self expression
of gender and sexual identity.63 The result is that many transgendered
men choose to retain their female genitalia permanently. The gender
binarism creates castes of transgendered people, in which the "post-
operative" reap the approbation of the legal categorization of their
acquired gender, including the right to marry someone of their former
gender.6M Because of the relative difficulty of female-to-male surgery,
trangendered men find themselves without the perks of full transfor-
mation.
D. The Shape of Transphobia
Legal problems facing transgendered people in the free world
help contextualize the situation of transgendered prisoners. Legal
authorities generally presume the existence of only two sexes, creating
a wide range of legal problems, such as "identity" problems (arising
from the contrast of the previous and present gender in official docu-
ments), "category" problems, such as public bathroom use, and
problems of discrimination.
1. "Identity" Issues
"A person's sex becomes fixed by operation of a court order, not
by virtue of an ambiguous natural order."65 Even in the free world,
various legal complexities accompany the transgendered in their re-
negotiation of their public identity during and after their transforma-
tions. "Identity" problems arise in nearly every area of daily life. The
discrepancy between one's official identity, which appears on a license
or social security card, and one's present identity may only be rectified
through application to the appropriate authorities.6 The official
63. See LOmSTEIN, supra note 29, at 6-7, 14, cited in GARBER, supra note 11, at 101.
64. See generally, BoRNsrIN, supra note 4, at 121.
65. Franke, supra note 1, at 52.
66. Generally, one must file an application in a state court for a name change. See, e.g., In
re Eck, 245 NJ. Super. 220 (1991) (reversing lower court's denial of application for
name change by transgendered female); see generally, Aeyal M. Gross, Rights and
Normalization: A Critical Study of European Human Rights Case Law on the Choice
and Change ofNames, 9 HARtv. Hum. RTs. J. 269, 281 (1996); Sheila Lee Pearson, In
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sanctioning of gender identity poses a burden on transgendered peo-
ple. One post-operative transgendered woman moved from Minnesota
to Idaho with her new husband. She had licenses for her gun and for
driving, which were issued prior to her transformation. The local po-
lice learned of her transgendered identity and, early one morning,
arrested her for illegal possession of a weapon and for fraudulent mar-
riage.67 This woman was able to demonstrate her rights only by means
of an examination of her genitalia. Essentially, the law criminalized
transgendered identity for violating its dualistic conception of gen-
der.68 Such problems arise incessantly for a pre-operative or non-
operative transgendered person, exposing them to permanent victimi-
zation by the law's gender binarism that forces people into either the
category "male" or "female."
2. "Category" Problems
Category problems are those that arise when a transgendered per-
son enters into a space defined for "males" or "females." Many
transgendered people, especially those in transition, try to avoid such
situations. For example, they might avoid showering at the gym or
avoid using public bathrooms. 69 Those with fixed gender identities
often object to having a transgendered person use the bathroom of
their sex. A pre-operative transgendered female would likely feel more
comfortable in a women's bathroom, where she may reapply her
makeup and retain privacy by using stalls. However, many women
object to, and indeed the law forbids, having a human with a penis in
their bathroom. 70 Thus pre-operative transgendered females are often
re McIntyre: A Victory fir Pre-Operative Transgender Persons, 8 L. & SExuALirT 731
(1998) (discussing the controversy over name changing).
67. See Melinda Whiteway, Address at National Lesbian and Gay Lawyers' Association
Conference (Nov. 1994).
68. See Shafiquflah, supra note 27, at 195.
69. Susan Solomon provides advice on how to cope with bathroom difficulties, suggest-
ing that "the safest approach is to use the facilities designated for the gender that [one
is] presenting," and then leave quickly to avoid attention. See SusAN LYNN SOLOMON,
EXPLORING THE PAPER TRAIL 57 (1995). Leslie Feinberg presents several poignant vi-
gnettes of the painful acts transgendered people do to avoid humiliation and danger
in the bathroom situation. LESLIE FEINBERG, STONE BUTCH BLUES 183 (1993).
70. See Doe v. Boeing, 846 P.2d 531, 533 (Wash. 1993). The law penalizes use of an
"inappropriate" public bathroom as lewd and dangerous behavior. See SOLOMON, su-
pra note 69, at 56.
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forced to use men's rooms, exposing them to potential humiliation. In
one example, an older crossdresser, Debra, went to the men's room
although she was dressed as a woman. 71 Emerging from a stall, she was
blocked and threatened with rape by a drunk man. Debra escaped,
but her ordeal indicates how such places, from bathrooms to bars to
prisons, are fertile for the abuse of transgendered people.
3. Discrimination Issues
Discrimination based on transgendered identity is commonplace;
police officers, doctors, landlords, and public officials treat transgen-
dered people with bigotry and hatred. Transgendered people face
employment discrimination, against which they have no legal re-
course.72 Transgendered people may be fired for dressing as their
target gender during their transformation. 73 Even sex-reassignment
surgery for hermaphrodites may be an appropriate basis for discrimi-
nation.74
Doctors sometimes abuse or take advantage of transgendered
people who depend on them for their transformation. Insurance
rarely covers medical expenses associated with transgenderism. 7 Fi-
nally, family law decisions often deny transgendered people the right
71. See SOLOMON, supra note 69, at 56.
72. Courts have repeatedly denied transgendered people protection from employment
discrimination. See Jennifer L. Nevins, Getting Dirty: A Litigation Strategy for Chal-
lenging Sex Discrimination Law by Beginning with Transsexualism, 24 N.Y.U. REV. L.
& Soc. CHANGE 383 (1998).
73. See, e.g., Kirkpatrick v. Seligman & Latz, 636 F.2d 1047 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding
that district court appropriately dismissed civil rights action against employer that
terminated a pre-operative transgendered female for wearing women's clothing be-
cause she was not a woman).
74. See, e.g., Julie Greenberg, Defining Male and Female: Intersexuality and the Collision
between Law and Biology, 41 Asuz. L. REv. 265 (1999).
75. Transgendered people are subject to regular mistreatment by doctors. See, e.g.,
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 829 (1994) (describing plaintiff Farmer as having
undergone a botched black market testicle removal operation). In her book, STONE
BuTrcH BLUES, Leslie Feinberg describes similar black market procedures. See
FEINBERG, supra note 69, at 162.
76. Sex-reassignment surgery, for example, is often not covered by medical insurance.
The exception, apparently, is Minnesota, which does provide Medicaid funds for sex-
change operations. See Joyce Price, Minnesota Using Medicaid Funding to Pay for Sex-
Change Operations, WASHINGTON TIMES, Feb. 4, 1996, at A4, cited in Maggert v.
Hanks, 131 F.3d 670, 672 (1997).
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to custody or even to see their children. The European Community
is a rare exception to this general rule, specifically banning employ-
ment discrimination against transgendered people.7' Few jurisdictions
protect transgendered people under state and local anti-sex discrimi-
nation laws." In sum, transgendered people face a wide range of
arbitrary treatment in all aspects of their lives.
II. DOUBLY IMPRISONED: TRANSGENDERED PRISONER PLACEMENT
"We're trying to not treat him differently than anyone else."
-Corrections officer about transgendered woman inmate."
A. The CrueZ the Unusua and the Transgendered-Prison Law and Life
All the above issues confront transgendered people before incar-
ceration. Once imprisoned, transgendered people find fighting for
their gender identity a monumental task, as they confront the gender
segregation, transphobia, and limited resources of the prison system.
Transgendered prisoners' needs challenge even the most reform-
minded institutions in their goal to provide humane treatment. A pre-
cise calculation of the transgendered prisoner population appears
impossible, because limited statistical studies prevent any accurate
population-based estimates. The problem is exacerbated by the likeli-
hood of concentrated transgender populations in certain cities and
77. See, e.g., J.L.S. v. D.K.S. n/k/a S.D.S., 943 S.W.2d 766 (Mo. Cc. App. 1997)
(overturning joint custody award to transgendered father); see also, Missouri Appeals
Court Reverses Custody Grant to Transsexual Father; Remands for Reconsideration of
Visitation Order, LESBIAN & GAY L. NoTEs, April 1997, at 41-42; Cisek v. Cisek,
1982 WL 6161 (Ohio App.) (denying visitation rights to transgendered woman).
78. The Court of Justice of the European Communities banned employment discrimi-
nation against transsexuals. P. v. S. and Cornwall County Council, Case C-13/94,
[1996] 2 C.M.L.R. 247; see also, LESBIAN & GAY L. NOTES, June 1996, at 82-83
(commenting on case and its ramifications for lesbian and gay employment discrimi-
nation law).
79. See, e.g., Rentos v. Oce-Office Systems, 1996 WL 737215 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 24);
Maffei v. Kolaeton Industry, Inc., 626 N.Y.S.2d 391 (Sup. Ct., N.Y.Co. 1995); see
also, LESBIAN & GAY L. NOTES, Feb. 1996, at 11 (commenting on the Rentos case).
80. Kim Alyce Marks, TranssexualAdjusts to Men' Prison, DAILY OEIAHOMAN, July 20,
1986, at 7.
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areas of the country8' and the fluidity of transgendered identity. 2 For
example, there are seventy prisoners on hormone treatments in New
York State prisons and seventeen in the New York City prisons."
Based on these figures, a vague estimate that transgendered prisoners
number in the low thousands might be the closest possible guess.
The prison authority has the power to place transgendered pris-
oners either in a virtual torture chamber of incessant sexual
humiliation or in a more benign environment. 4 Several placement
options exist, each with its own advantages and disadvantages. After
describing the legal standards governing prison conditions and prison
life generally, this section explores those options.
The legal foundation built by prison reform litigation has estab-
lished that, although their rights are limited, "[p]rison inmates do not
shed all fundamental protections of the Constitution at the prison
gates."85 Courts analyzing prisoners' rights must first assess what right
may have been violated. Turner v. Safley86 provided four factors to de-
termine whether a prison regulation is reasonable: 1) the existence of a
81. Although presuming geographical concentrations of transgendered people might be
ill-informed, it seems to be a fair assumption based on the geographical concentration
of lesbian and gay people, which appears to be based on the establishment of com-
munity institutions and other support networks. For example, in New York, there
exists a community support network for the transgender community, such as the
Gender Identity Clinic at the Lesbian and Gay Community Center in New York.
Interview with Dr. Barbara Warren, Director of Mental Health Services at the Les-
bian and Gay Community Services Center, in New York, New York (July 2, 1996)
[hereinafter Warren Interview]. Lesbian and gay geographical concentration may
point to a similar phenomenon among transgendered people. See MANUEL CASTELLS,
THE CITY AND THE GRAssRooTs: A CRoss-CuLTuRAL THEORY OF URBAN SocIAL
MOVEMENTS 138-40 (1982); Barbara Weightman, Commentary: Towards a Geogra-
phy of the Gay Community, 1 J. CULTURa. GEOGRAPHY 106, 107 (1981).
82. See Eric Houston, Transsexuals Denounce Confinement. Inmates Want to be Treated
According to Sexual Preference, SEATrLE POST-INTELULGENCER, Sept. 7, 1993, at B1.
One corrections official said that no estimate could be made of transgendered people
incarcerated in Washington, partially because some claims of transsexuality were
questionable.
83. See Dennis Duggan, Is Treatment for Sex Change a Prison Perk?, NEWSDAY, Dec. 13,
1994, at A14.
84. It should be noted that placement troubles arise principally with regard to transgen-
dered women. Transgendered men placed in women's prisons generally do not face
the abuse that transgendered women face. In women's prisons, women will try to
bond with transgendered men for security, protection, and social support. Thus,
transgendered men do not face the ostracism and violence that transgendered women
suffer.
85. Powell v. Schriver, 175 F.3d 107, 112 (2d Cir. 1999).
86. 482 U.S. 79 (1987).
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valid and rational connection between the regulation and the legiti-
mate interest purportedly advanced by it; 2) the existence of
alternative means for the exercise of the allegedly violated right; 3) the
negative consequences to penological interests by the accommodation
of the right asserted; and 4) the existence of an alternative to the
regulation that meets the prisoners' asserted right with minimal cost
to penal interests.87
Courts view the principal issues facing transgendered prisoners
through the lens of Eighth Amendment protections. When medical
and living conditions fall below an allowable standard, they may con-
stitute cruel and unusual punishment. A valid Eighth Amendment
claim by a transgendered prisoner must survive the test articulated in
Turner."8
The Farmer case redefined the standard of deliberate indifference
required to establish an Eighth Amendment violation.8 In Farmer, the
Court decided on a subjective proof standard for the prison official's
recklessness, requiring that the official know of and ignore an
Cexcessive" risk to inmate health or safety.90 Specific notice that the
inmate-plaintiff may be in danger, or the identity of likely assailants,
may not be required.9' Awareness of widespread inmate rape, for ex-
ample, renders specific knowledge of who would attack whom
irrelevant.92 Thus, although the standard enunciated by the Supreme
Court retreats from the more easily met objective test, the Farmer test
does not require proof of criminal intent.9
Misplacement or mistreatment of transgendered people based on
an erroneous understanding of sexual identity is cruel and unusual
87. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-91; see also, Sarah Botz & Robert C. Scherer, Project,
Substantive Rights Retained By Prisoners, 84 GEo. LJ. 1465, 1465 (1996).
88. See Turner, 482 U.S. at 89-91.
89. The term was first employed by the United States Supreme Court in Estelle v. Gam-
ble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1977) which situated the constitutionally unacceptable
intentions of the prison officials somewhere between negligence and purpose. See
Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994).
90. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 835. In-part, the basis for this holding was Wilson
v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294 (1991), in which the Court held that prison officials would
not be liable solely because of the presence of objectively inhumane prison condi-
tions.
91. SeeFarmerv. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 843.
92. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 843 (quotations and citations omitted).
93. For a derailed analysis of the development of the jurisprudence regarding the
"deliberate indifference" standard, see Thomas K. Landry, "Punishment" and the
Eighth Amendment, 57 OHIO ST. LJ. 1607, 1616-19 (1996).
[VCol. 6:499
"TRAPPED" IN SING-SING
punishment. 94 However, Eighth Amendment analysis prevents only
the most egregious violations of prisoners' rights regarding living con-
ditions and medical treatment, among other situations. Although
transgendered prisoners' needs fall into these two areas, the greater
issue of the right to gender self determination falls through the cracks
of such analysis.
Transgendered prisoners' needs constitute one of many chal-
lenges facing correctional authorities who need to balance calls for
humane treatment and Constitutional requirements with staffing and
budget limitations. The prison reform litigation movement achieved
much in eliminating the worst abuses of prison life,95 and in forcing
the professionalization of corrections administration, 96 the provision of
basic medical care,97 and the elevation of general living standards, 98
albeit to a minimal level.9  Old problems, such as a lack of work
training or education, 00 overcrowding,10° and underbudgeting, con-
tinue. '12 The general trend toward justifying abusive situations for
prisoners, exemplified by the resurgence of chain-gangs, harsh treat-
ment for adolescent offenders, and privatization of prisons, has led to
tighter budgets permitting few ameliorations. In addition, the gateway
criminal justice system exacerbates class, race, and ethnicity based ine-
qualities. A transgendered prisoner's first exposure to the trials of
prison life occur during pre-incarceration processing.
94. See David Heffernan, Comment, America the Cruel and Unusual? An Analysis of the
Eighth Amendment Under International Law, 45 CAT. U. L. REv. 481, 500 (1996).
95. The prison reform litigation movement's successes and failures are brilliantly cata-
logued and analyzed in Susan Sturm's sister articles, The Legacy and Future of
Corrections Litigation, 142 U.PA. L. REv. 639, 660-61 (1993) [hereinafter Sturm,
Corrections Litigation], and Lawyers at the Prison Gates: Organizational Structure and
Corrections Advocacy, 27 U. MICH. J.L. RvFom 1 (1993).
96. See Sturm, Corrections Litigation, supra note 95, at 665-68.
97. See Sturm, Corrections Litigation, supra note 95, at 671-72.
98. See Sturm, Corrections Litigation, supra note 95, at 671-72.
99. See Sturm, Corrections Litigation, supra note 95, at 671, 674.
100. See Sturm, Corrections Litigation, supra note 95, at 675.
101. See Justin Brooks, How Can We Sleep While the Beds are Burning?: The Tumultuous
Prison Culture of Attica Flourishes in American Prisons Twenty-Five Years Later, 47
SYvacus L. Rav. 159, 179-80 (1996).
102. See Brooks, supra note 101, at 179-80.
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B. Categorizing Gender: Pre-Incarceration Processing
Whether in a holding cell or a maximum security institution,
detainees and prisoners are segregated into men's and women's facili-
ties or housing areas. The overwhelming majority of prisons segregate
men and women, most often by maintaining separate prisons.' 3 The
obvious conundrum of categorizing the transgendered for placement
purposes arises directly from this policy of segregation. This seemingly
simple classification is an intractable problem when categorizing a
transgendered person. Sex segregation causes and aggravates many ills
within the prison system by accentuating sex differences within each
segregated environment.
The processing of inmates is therefore an important moment for
a transgendered person: will she or he be placed in the "M" or the "F"
box? Pre-sentence reports provide sentencing judges with a portrait of
the prisoner, and such reports should include a space for the presen-
tencing officer to discuss gender issues more fully than currently
permitted. Prisoners should be allowed to present medical, psycho-
logical, and even physical evidence to support their assertions of
gender identity. This idea of demonstrating one's gender stems from
the sexual declaratory hearing, in which a court determines the sex of
the person.' ° If the pre-sentencing officer obviously misreports the
gender identity of the prisoner, or if a prisoner requests reconsidera-
tion of the reporting, judges should intervene to insist that the
prisoner is appropriately categorized and treated. Prison authorities
should designate a sensitive, knowledgeable, and sympathetic person
to deal with transgendered prisoner requests to prevent the arbitrary
denial of appropriate treatment. Treatment of transgendered people
should be standardized within prison systems to maximize the ration-
ality of the practices assumed.
Speedy and dignified treatment is essential for the sensitive han-
dling of the pre-incarceration processing. In one case, an inmate was
isolated for two weeks while prison authorities tried to determine
whether she was a man or a woman. In that case, the Chief of
Corrections of Chelan County Regional Jail in Washington stated
"We isolated her, him.... We put her in an infirmary. Or him in an
103. See O'Brien, supra note 62, at 85.
104. See Franke, supra note 1, at 41 n.157 (citing Corbett v. Corbett, 1971 P. 83 (1970),
in which a court determined the meaning of the sex of one of the spouses).
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infirmary."'O5 The time that passed with the inmate in solitary was
used to determine her sex and then to decide where to place her. In-
stituting policies regarding placement of transgendered prisoners
would avert the delay and the indignity of having one's identity scru-
tinized.
Notably, the right to present such evidence has been denied in
one case, albeit in a post-imprisonment setting.16 In 1986, Lavarita
Meriwether sued primarily because prison authorities denied her
medical treatment. She claimed that her equal protection rights were
violated because, at an evidentiary hearing, she was not allowed to ar-
gue that she should be classified as a female and placed in a women's
correctional institution. The district court's rejection of this claim was
upheld by the Seventh Circuit, which decided that an administrative
decision could not give rise to an equal protection claim without evi-
dence of discriminatory intent.0 7 The Seventh Circuit refused to deal
with the fundamental challenge transgendered people pose to the sex-
based system of incarceration.
The above-suggested reforms might prevent claims such as Ms.
Meriwether's. In terms of the pre-incarceration period, no serious
negative consequences to penal interests result from assigning a gender
to a new prisoner and requiring the pre-sentencing officer and the
sentencing judge to attend to the issue of gender with more care.
Furthermore, the costs to the penal system of adopting such reforms
are minimal. Altering forms to provide for more than just a check-box
undoubtedly qualifies as a small expense. Instructing the relevant
public officials on how to handle transgender issues appropriately in
placement would require a more significant investment of resources,
including training and the preparation and distribution of materials to
ensure adequate compliance with the requirements. Nonetheless, this
investment might be considered an "ounce of prevention" to preempt
the need for a "pound of cure" later in the suffering and litigation that
result from an erroneous placement.
105. Martha Brockenbrough, He or She? Big Dilemma for Prison, Naws TiuB. (Tacoma
Wash.), Sept. 15, 1994, at Al.
106. See Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408 (7th Cir. 1987).
107. See Meriwether, 821 F.2d at 415 n.7.
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C. Genitalia-Based Placement
However reasonable the aforementioned adjustments may be,
such changes would require the prison system's acceptance that there
are indeed more than two genders; this represents a monumental
change in a system that still segregates on the basis of traditionally
defined gender.
Prison authorities generally place transgendered prisoners, re-
gardless of the extent of their nongenital transformation, based on
their genitalia.' 8 LAn inmate with a penis is considered male; one with
a vagina is considered female. It doesn't matter whether nature or a
surgeon provided the part."'0' Post-operative transgendered people
have had their genitalia surgically modified to resemble those of their
desired gender, so the practice of relying solely on genitalia for place-
ment does not generally pose a problem for them. On the other hand,
pre- and non-operative transsexuals face the most serious problems
related to placement because they are likely to be placed with their
initial gender, regardless of the extent of their nongenital physical
transformations.
Abuse often results from the placement of pre-operative trans-
gendered people based on their genitalia. Dee Farmer was placed in
the general population of a men's maximum security prison, even
though she had already undergone several years of hormonal therapy
with significant resulting feminization, including silicone breast im-
plants and a failed surgical removal of her testicles.1 Another case
involved a transgendered woman who had already been castrated and
was ordered to wear a brassiere despite her placement in a men's
prison."' The foolishness of always placing a transgendered woman
108. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 829 (1994); Farmer v. Haas, 990 F.2d 319,
320 (7th Cir. 1993). Of all the cases studied for this Article, only Crosby v. Reynolds,
763 F.Supp. 666 (D.Me. 1991), indicated that a pre-operative transgendered woman
had been placed in a women's prison, and in that case her cellmate sued because of
the placement. That this policy is the rule is demonstrated by an example extreme by
any measure. A transgendered woman, who had been castrated prior to incarceration,
was placed in a men's prison because she was still "anatomically male." In that prison,
she was ordered by the authorities to wear a bra. See Murray v. United States Bureau
of Prisons, No. 95-5204, 1997 WL 34677 (6th Cir. Jan. 10, 1997).
109. Brockenbrough, supra note 105 (quoting Ken Hollen, Associate Superintendent,
Shelton Corrections Center, Washington).
110. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 829-30.
111. See Murray, 1997 WL 34677.
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with breasts and feminine features in a men's prison demonstrates the
domination of the male/female binarism in prison organization. In
one case, where a transgendered woman had undergone hormonal and
surgical treatments including castration and her "penile tissue was
atrophic" 12 and nonfunctioning, she was denied a request for special
treatment because "her presentence report identified her as a 32 year-
old caucasian male.""' Unable and unwilling to allow for more com-
plexity than the two categories of male and female, penal authorities
rely on an anatomical aspect that to some people may be a very minor
factor in their gender makeup.
The placement of transgendered people is determined by what is
crude simplification of their gender identity. Because of such place-
ment by genitalia, a transgendered prisoner who has not undergone
genital transformation faces the profound stigma of being the only
prisoner who identifies with the sex that the prison excludes. At best,
this classification evokes her categorization according to a gender
identity that less than fully captures her identity. At worst, it forces
the assumption of a past gender identity.
1. The Mortal Dangers of Genitalia-Based Placement
Male prisons have an infamous history of creating and reinforc-
ing barbarous hierarchies of economic, social, and sexual subjugation
of the weak to the strong, hierarchies that affect and victimize all male
prisoners. This hierarchy existed with the support of what the prison
authorities dubbed the "trustee system," in which "trustees," or domi-
nant prisoners, would survey and enforce order against the general
population of the prison."4 Prison reform litigation succeeded in a de
jure ban on the trustee system, but it remains a dominant force in
prison life.
Dominant inmates seek to rape inmates who are young, less-
streetwise, effeminate, or gay."5 Transgendered prisoners often find
112. Lucrecia v. Samples, No. C-93-3651, 1995 WL 630016, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Oct 16,
1995).
113. Lucrecia, 1995 WL 630016, at*2.
114. See Sturm, Corrections Litigation, supra note 95, at 661.
115. See David M. Siegal, Rape In Prison andAIDS: A Challenge for the Eighth Amendment
Framework of Wilson v. Seiter, 44 STAN. L. REv. 1541, 1541-47 (1992); see also,
Charles M. Sennott, Prisons Urged to Wrest Assault from the Shadows, HARRISBURG
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themselves forced into the victim role in prison. Victims rarely report
such rapes because other prisoners punish snitches, even with death." 6
One study estimated that slightly less than a quarter of all inmates
have been raped.117 Yet prison systems officially deny the existence of
any sexual activity justifying their nonprovision of safe-sex instruction
and resources." 8 Widespread unsafe rape turns such sexual contact
into "death sentences."' 9 Although some prisons, such as the New
York City prison system, provide separate housing for gay inmates,
120
such housing may not provide the best solution for non-gay inmate-
victims of the sexual hierarchy in male prisons.
Unsurprisingly, the result of placing a transgendered woman in
this environment is rape and abuse, endemic in an atmosphere of de-
liberate indifference. 2 ' The illegality of rape'2 apparently has not
reduced the likelihood of its occurrence.H Ms. Farmer's placement in
the general population of a men's prison led to her violent rape.'24 In
PATRIOT & EVENING NEws, June 19, 1994, at G2 (discussing the frequency of gang
rapes in a Florida prison).
116. See Siegal, supra note 115, at 1545-46.
117. See CARL WEISS & DAVID JAMEs FRIAR, TERROR IN THE PRISONS 61(1974).
118. The failure of prisons to prevent the spread of AIDS has not been demonstrated to be
actionable. See Siegal, supra note 115, at 1572-74.
119. See Siegal, supra note 115, at 1578 ("Placing prisoners at risk of death when they
have not been sentenced to death upon a considered and just verdict is cruel and un-
usual punishment. The threat of death by AIDS as a result of rape creates just such a
risk.") However, this analysis now appears somewhat hyperbolic given the greater
control over AIDS symptoms.
120. See Telephone Interview with Thomas Antenen, Director of Public Information,
New York City Department of Corrections, May 29, 1997 [hereinafter Antenen In-
terview].
121. See Sennott, supra note 115; see, e.g., David McKay, Sex Change Surgery NotAllowed
for Prisoner, FT. WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Oct. 13, 1991, at 12.
122. "Homosexual rape or other violence among prison inmates serves absolutely no pe-
nological purpose." Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 852 (1994) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring). The rape suffered by Ms. Farmer was not raised in a Seventh Circuit
suit by Ms. Farmer to obtain hormone treatment. "Farmer was put in with male
prisoners-but without incident, in happy contrast to Meriwether v. Faulkner."
Farmer v. Haas, 990 F.2d 319, 320 (7th Cir. 1993).
123. See Taylor v. Michigan Dep't of Corrections, 69 F.3d 76 (6th Cir. 1995)(discussing
frequency of prison rape); Risley v. Hawk, 918 F. Supp. 18, 21 (D.D.C. 1996)
(discussing same).
124. See Fanner v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 830. One exception, Phillips v. Michigan Dep't.
of Corrections, 731 F. Supp. 792 (W.D. Mich. 1990), indicates that this problem,
while shockingly common, is not universal. The plaintiff, Marty Phillips, a thirty-
four year-old pre-operative transsexual, had undergone extensive facial and bodily
cosmetic surgery, as well as hormonal treatments to alter her appearance. She sued for
medical treatment to further complete her gender transformation. The court stated:
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another case, a sixty-one year old cross-dressed prisoner testified that
she had been raped twice while imprisoned in the general men's
population, both times while she was dressed as a woman.121
Acts by the guards cross the line from deliberate indifference to
acts of hostility and aggression. Not only do authorities turn a blind
eye to abuse by prisoners of transgendered inmates, but they permit
and occasionally encourage the mistreatment of transgendered inmates
by prison employees. For example, one pre-operative transgendered
woman testified that she was the victim of "attempted and completed
acts of violence and sexual assault" 26 and "harassment by prison offi-
cers and [was] forced to strip in front of officers and other inmates.
'' 2
Another pre-operative transgendered woman who works as a
street prostitute was harassed and arrested by the police, even though
she was not working at that time, and the officers had not witnessed
any work-related behavior. 28 Without any evidence of criminal con-
duct, the policemen arrested her and took her to jail. They put her in
the cell furthest from the guard station with forty-six men. She was
finally released eight hours later, after being raped by nearly all of the
men in the cell." 9
In another case, Rosio Melgoza, a transgendered woman, was ar-
rested as a result of a wage dispute.30 The arresting officers reportedly
touched her breasts and genitalia with their hands and a nightstick. 3'
Two days after the arrest, she was allegedly strip searched in front of
sixty male inmates and then placed in a cell with them, where she was
the victim of multiple sexual assaults. 32 The charges against Ms.
"Plaintiff states that she has been treated well on the whole in the male facility. She
states that the male inmates are used to her and no longer stare or make her feel un-
comfortable. She Is also able to use the bathroom and shower privately." Phillips, 731
F. Supp. at 793 n.l.
125. See Long v. Nix, 877 F. Supp. 1358, 1361 n.3 (S.D. Iowa 1995); see also Long v.
Nix, 86 F.3d 761 (8th Cir. 1996). Ms. Long testified that the rapes took place when
she was in her thirties and forties.
126. Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 410 (7th Cir. 1987).
127. Meriwether, 821 F.2d at 411.
128. See Telephone Interview with Riki Anne Wilchins, Founder, Transsexual Menace
(June 15, 1996) [hereinafter Wilchins Interview].
129. See WILCHINS, READ My Lips, supra note 10, at 23; Wilchins Interview, supra note
128.
130. See Karen Nikos, Transsexual Says Arrest Led to Abuse, LA. DAILY NEws, Aug. 2,
1991, at N6.
131. See Nikos, supra note 130.
132. See Nikos, supra note 130.
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Melgoza were dropped.'33 The offending police officers did not pro-
vide the prisoners with condoms, thereby elevating the foreseeable
gang rape into a possible HIV infection or reinfection. This was likely
the case in the other rapes discussed above, given the general absence
of safe-sex practices in prisons."' Finally, given the pattern of abuse in
the reported cases, it is probable that most imprisoned transgendered
women are raped or abused on a regular basis.' 35
In one case, Susan Marie Pollock, a transgendered prisoner, had
undergone extensive procedures and developed size 36C breasts. She
was denied hormone treatments, and prison guards harassed her.'36 In
another case, Michelle Murray claimed that a prison guard assaulted
her, and that other guards propositioned and attempted to assault
her. 37 Another transgendered woman, arrested for drunk driving in
Atlanta, was allegedly groped by an officer.' Yet harassment and ver-
bal abuse rarely constitutes a violation of the Eighth Amendment."'
2. The Failure to Eliminate Genitalia-Based Segregation:
The Co-Correctional Experiment
In theory, the most sweeping solution to gender segregation
would be the establishment of co-correctional facilities. In the 1970s,
prison reform groups saw segregation as the principal limitation for
the development of equal treatment of women prisoners. 140 Co-
133. See Nikos, supra note 130.
134. This danger perhaps has led to the high rate of seropositivity in prisons. The danger
of infection is not alleviated for those already infected with HIV, as they still may be
reinfected with a different strain of HIV. See, e.g., Firmer v. Hawk, No. 94-CV-
2274, 1996 WL 525321 (D.D.C. Sept. 5, 1996).
135. For example, the plaintiff in Lucrecia v. Samples, No. C-93-3651, 1995 WL 630016
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 1995), did not report the rape, but did report repeated strip
searches, groping, leering, verbal humiliation and other sexual harassment.
136. See Tom Beyerlein, Transsexual Longs for Transfer Inmate's Unhappy as One of the
Guys, DAYTON DAILY NEws, Mar. 31, 1994, at IA; Transsexual Inmate Sues fir
Rights, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio), Apr. 1, 1994, at 5B (discussing Ms.
Pollock's case).
137. See U.S. Judge Lets Transsexual Inmate Do Research for Lawsuit, THE COUuaER-
JOURNAL (Louisville, Ky.), June 24, 1994, at B3.
138. See Sandra McIntosh, Atlanta Jail Officer Facing Sex Charge: His Frisk Became a
Grope, Contends TranssexualInmate, ATLANTA CONST., Dec. 5, 1993, at E4.
139. See Judge Drops All But One Defendants from Transsexual Prisoner's Suit, CouuIER-
JouRAs. (Louisville, Ky.), Nov. 12, 1994, at A13.
140. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Feminist Challenge in Criminal Law, 143 U. PA. L.
Rav. 2151, 2204 (1995).
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correctional institutions mix men and women prisoners by placing
them in the same prison, separated by cell, hall, or cellblock.1
4
'
Advocates argued that co-correctional prisons would afford pris-
oners many advantages over life in single-sex prisons. Geographical
proximity to their families 42 and access to the same recreational, vo-
cational, and educational opportunities provided to men 4 1 would
improve life. Men would act differently in the context of a co-
correctional institution, even with limited interaction with women.
For example, scholars of women's prisons point to the construction of
"play-families" among women prisoners that reveal "how the power
structure within women's prisons may be very different from the
power structure within men's prisons where gangs are the most com-
mon social grouping."' 4 A variant on co-correctional institutions is
the "coordinate" model, which creates a women's institution next to a
men's institution where resources are shared.
45
As promising as co-correctional prisons may seem in abolishing
gender segregation, general consensus among prisoner's rights advo-
cates is that the experiment was an utter failure. "' 6  The
overwhelmingly male population in co-correctional institutions led to
security problems between men and women, which required placing
'47
women under higher levels of control and denying them resources.
Mixed-sex facilities still exist, but the separation of the sexes within
the facility hardly makes them co-correctional, since even recreational
and educational programs are segregated. 8
141. See generally, Rosemary Herbert, Women's Prisons: An Equal Protection Evaluation, 94
YALE L. J. 1182, 1184 (1985)
At the federal level, some minimum-security prisons were formerly co-
correctional. See Schulhofer, supra note 140, at 2204.
At the state level as of June 30, 1991, there were 624 male prisons, 67 female
prisons, and 33 co-correctional fcilities. See AMERICAN CoRREcriONA. ASsOCIA-
TION, DIRECTORY, JUVENILE & ADULT CORRECTIONAL DEPARTMENTS, INSTITUTIONS,
AGENCIES & PAROLING AUTHORITIES, xxii (1992); Lisa Krim, A Reasonable Woman's
Version of Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Cross-Gender, Clothed Body-Searches of
Women Prisoners, 6 UCLA WoMEN'S L.J. 85, 110, 110 n.119 (1985).
142. See Schulhofer, supra note 140, at 2204.
143. See Schulhofer, supra note 140, at 2204.
144. Krim, supra note 141, at 115.
145. See Nicole Hahn Rafter, Even in Prison, Women are Second-Class Citizens, HUMAN
RIGHrs, Spring 1987, at 31, 51.
146. See generally, Rafter, supra note 145 (discussing pooling of resources to aid women
inmates).
147. See Rafter, supra note 145, at 28.
148. See Rafter, supra note 145, at 28.
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One might argue that the abolition of gender segregation would
benefit transgendered prisoners by lifting the iron curtain between the
sexes. Placing a transgendered prisoner in a co-correctional facility
would permit the transgendered person to live as she wished, with ac-
cess to the resources of both men's and women's prisons.
This failure of the co-correctional remedy warns of the difficulty
of abolishing the gender binarism's hold on contemporary society, and
points to the challenge confronting prisons in placing individuals that
do not easily fit into male or female categories.
3: Potential Reforms for Genitalia-Based Placement
Given the failure of attempts to end sex segregation, reform of
the current system may be the best option for transgendered prisoners.
Current placement methods put transgendered people into the general
population of prisoners with like genitalia, which may be appropriate
for some transgendered prisoners. 9 In cases where security issues
arise, prison authorities often force transgendered people into segre-
gation. These two placement options, as discussed above, do not
provide sufficiently comfortable or safe environments for a transgen-
dered inmate.
Certain practices could improve these situations. Prison authori-
ties can break the cycle of deliberate indifference to prison rape, and
protect transgendered inmates from such trauma. First, prison
authorities should commit themselves to prosecuting inter-prisoner
violence and rape. Second, they should identify potential or known
attackers and put them on notice that violence will be severely pun-
ished. 5' Third, prison officials can identify likely targets for aggression
and assist them in dealing with sexual pressure, and to encourage
them to report rape early to permit the identification and punishment
of attackers.' Fourth, prison authorities can strictly enforce the rules
Moreover, the coordinate model, which purportedly addresses the security
problems women face in a mixed facility, falls short of its goal, often leaving women
with a markedly inferior existence. Notes from Telephone Conversation with
Marjorie Rifkin, StaffAttorney, the National Prison Project, June 13, 1997.
149. See Jennifer Gonnerman, Love Behind Bars: Lipstick, Love Letters and Laundry: Five
Men Talk About Their Prison Romances, VILLAGE VoICE, May 13, 1997, at 46.
150. See Sennotr, supra note 115.
151. See Sennott, supra note 115; Mary Dallao, Fighting Prison Rape: How to Make Your
Facility Safer, Co, EcnoNs TODAY, Dec. 1, 1996, at 100, 101 (discussing a bill pro-
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with regard to the treatment of transgendered prisoners by other in-
mates.
4. Centralization of Placement Resources
Another important reform is the centralization of resources
among neighboring states. As one prison official commented, "[a]n
inmate could go to California or New York, where the penal system
has special units for transsexual offenders." 52 Perhaps the most im-
portant argument in favor of centralization is that such a policy would
foster a rationalization of prison procedures regarding transgendered
inmates. Especially on the state and local levels, prison authorities ap-
pear to act in an ad hoc fashion by providing or denying special
treatment to transgendered inmates as they see fit at the moment."'
Although one might ascribe such randomness to disrespect, the fact
that there are so few transgendered inmates discourages the creation of
set rules for treatment. By combining resources, different jurisdictions
that take the lead on provision of appropriate placement and treat-
ment might provide such services for inmates in other states.
Differences in state policies, along with the privatization of some
prison systems, might make such centralization difficult. Nonetheless
such a policy, even if enacted in a limited fashion, might practicably
permit serious advances in the humane placement and treatment of
transgendered prisoners.
D. Segregation
One common solution is to place the transgendered person in
segregation, generally in a single cell. Segregation may provide greater
security to the prisoner, as in Ms. Farmer's case, where she had re-
quested segregation for security and was instead left in the general
population. However, such segregation excludes the prisoner from
equal participation in prison life. First, separating transgendered
posed in Illinois to inform new inmates during orientation of the threat of rape in
prison).
152. Washington Department of Corrections Secretary Chase Riveland, quoted in
Brockenbrough, supra note 105.
153. See, e.g., Dan Bernstein, Set Policy on Sex Treatment, Prison Told, THE SAcRAmENTO
BEE, July 2, 1991, at B4.
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people might not make them safer because their segregation empha-
sizes their difference to the prison population, exposing them to
ridicule. One transgendered woman was segregated in a men's prison
to determine whether she would be released into the general popula-
tion. After she was placed in the general population, she was attacked
by another inmate. Prison officials returned her to a segregated cell as
the investigation into the attack proceeded.'54 Faced with the choice
between segregation and genitalia-based placement, some transgen-
dered people might choose to be placed in the general population,
especially prisoners who no longer fear rape because of their age or
appearance. For example, one sextagenarian transgendered woman did
"not fear sexual attack by inmates as he is 61 years old."'55
Automatic segregation may provide an improvement in safety,
but at a high comfort cost to the transgendered prisoner. Other con-
cerns arise. One pre-operative transgendered woman complained that
segregation denied her adequate "recreation, living space, educational
and occupational rehabilitation opportunities, and associational rights
for nonpunitive reasons." 56 Such differential treatment might leave
the prisoner in a worse position than the other prisoners. Segregation
should only be used as a protective measure. Rather than punish the
transgendered inmate for the general population's intolerance, prison
authorities should engage in the above-mentioned actions to improve
life in the prison for the transgendered person. Only in two circum-
stances should a transgendered prisoner be placed in segregation:
where she requests the segregation for her own safety or well-being, or
where the danger to the prisoner is so patently clear that prison
authorities would be exhibiting deliberate indifference to leave her in
the general population.
154. Subsequently, she was placed in segregation as punishment for her refusal to wear a
brassiere in a men's prison. In addition, Ms. Farmer was forced into solitary con-
finement for approximately a year because she was allegedly observed engaging in
sexual contact. See Murray v. United States Bureau of Prisons, No. 95-5204, 1997
WL 34677, at *1 (6th Cir. Jan. 10, 1997).
155. Long v. Nix, 877 F. Supp. 1358, 1361 (S.D. Iowa 1995).
156. Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 416 (7th Cir. 1987).
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E. Placement Based on the Gender Identity of the Prisoner
Placement based on self-defined gender identity would be ideal
for transgendered people, given a sex-dichotomized prison system.'57
One significant advantage to placing transgendered prisoners based on
their gender identity is the avoidance of difficult situations with other
prisoners.
The principal problem with this solution is the comfort and secu-
rity of the traditionally-gendered prisoners in the prison in which the
transgendered prisoner is placed. In one case, a transgendered man
was placed among women, who complained, "there's a man in the
tank." 58 Likewise, one police officer, commenting on the incarcera-
tion of a transgendered woman "who looked more like a woman than
the other women," would not fit in with male inmates. 59 Potential
intolerance toward a transgendered person, however, should not be
the sole factor in determining the best placement: bigotry does not
merit such accommodation. Because prisons principally concern
themselves with order, prison officials would likely object to any re-
form that could cause disruption in the prison environment.
However, even if objections to housing transgendered women in
a women's prison stem from homophobia, such objections require
consideration. Legitimate objections to housing transgendered in-
mates according to their self-defined gender identity do exist. First,
the prisoner who must share a cell with a transgendered person may
object. One example is Juanita Crosby's claim in her case against a
Maine county jail. 16 In this case, the jail placed Ms. Cheyenne Lamson,
a 6'1" pre-operative transsexual who had undergone estrogen treat-
ments, developed breasts, and lost penile sexual function, in a
women's prison. The doctor saw her placement with women as ad-
vantageous, especially when compared to living with male inmates,
who would have caused Ms. Lamson "physical and psychological
157. Many transgendered people have requested such housing. See, e.g., Beyerlein, supra
note 136 (stating that Ms. Pollock, a transgendered woman, had requested transfer to
a women's prison); Sweeney, supra note 2 (discussing Marty Phillips's desire to be
transferred to a women's prison).
158. Houston, supra note 82.
159. Commander John Szalda of the Lynnwood, Washington Police Department, quoted
in Wayne Wurzer, Inmate Turns Out to Be Someone She's Not, S.A=rm TiMEs, Nov.
30, 1994, at B1.
160. See Crosby v. Reynolds, 763 F.Supp. 666 (1991).
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harm."1 61 Ms. Crosby, her cell-mate, sued because Ms. Lamson acci-
dentally entered her part of the cell when she was on the toilet, 162 a
recurring discomfort. Ms. Crosby refrained from showering'63 to avoid
being nude in front of Ms. Lamson. The court determined that, given
the lack of alternatives and the lack of established procedures, the
authorities could not have understood their actions as violative of the
plaintiffs Constitutional rights.J In another case in which a trans-
gendered woman was placed in a women's prison, prison authorities
admitted that the other two female prisoners had difficulties coping
with their new cellmate.' 6" Women have complained that their cell-
mate was growing a beard.'"
Further, a transgendered woman in women's prisons might have
sex with the other women. In the women's facility on Riker's Island in
New York City, a pre-operative transgendered woman was having sex
•167
with other women inmates. 6 This potential sexual activity could
make it more difficult for prison authorities to place a transgendered
person based on her gender identity.
Another legitimate challenge is that a transgendered woman
might be violent against other women. However improbable this may
seem, transgendered prisoners convicted of violent sex crimes, like all
those convicted of such crimes, should be placed with the greatest
care. Prison officials should not carelessly place those convicted of or
known for sexual violence against a particular sex with members of
that sex. Prison authorities have not shown the greatest sensitivity in
dealing with sex offenders, placing them arbitrarily in the general
prison population without regard to the dangers they might pose. 68 As
with any prison, prison authorities should be conscious of such dan-
gers. In one case, Jean Marie Druley, an advanced pre-operative
transgendered woman, was incarcerated for killing her girlfriend.'69
161. Crosby, 763 F. Supp. at 667.
162. See Crosby, 763 F. Supp. at 667.
163. See Crosby, 763 F. Supp. at 667.
164. See Crosby, 763 F. Supp. at 670.
165. See Cohen, supra note 46.
166. See Wurzer, supra note 159.
167. See Compton Interview, supra note 51.
168. See Redman v. County of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1437-39 (9th Cir. 1991) (in
which an eighteen year-old boy was placed with a man known as an "aggressive ho-
mosexual," who repeatedly and violently raped him).
169. SeeMarks, supra note 80.
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Obviously, such an inmate would be an unsuitable candidate for
placement among women.
Yet, placement according to the gender identity might be more
feasable if the prison procedures were modified. First, concerns about
the discomfort that may result from sharing a cell could be addressed
by placing the transgendered inmate in a smaller, single bed cell. Sec-
ond, to meet the needs of transgendered prisoners and avoid
discomfort among the general prison population, prison officials
could take a more active role in placement. For example, they could
survey prisoners to determine the most tolerant cellmate before
placement occurs. Surveying is easier in smaller prisons, where there is
more personal contact between the guards and social service providers
and the prisoners. In a prison where a transgendered prisoner would
be housed, sensitivity training of prisoners and prison officials could
ease the integration of the transgendered prisoner into the prison
population.1
70
The careful placement of transgendered people could cost the
prisons far less than other remedies because it requires little change in
prison organization. It also may be less disruptive to penal interests
than placing the transgendered inmate among people of her initial sex,
which might lead to more violence and disorder than would exist in a
placement according to gender identity.
Finally, it must be noted that placing a transgendered woman in
a women's prison will not necessarily improve her conditions, because
women prisoners receive treatment inferior to that of male prison-
ers.'7' Because women constitute a far smaller incarcerated population
than men, many states incarcerate all women together, regardless of
their crime, 72 requiring many women's prisons to follow maximum
security procedures,1 73 including body searches.'74  Despite faster
growth,'7' resources in women's prisons rarely match those in men's
prisons, 76 which contain a population over eighteen times that of
170. For example, sensitivity training regarding rape could address transgendered issues.
Cf Dallao, supra note 151.
171. See Herbert, supra note 141; Stefanie Fleisher Seldin, A Strategy for Advocacy on Be-
half of Women Offenders, 5 COLum. J. GENDER & L. 1 (1995).
172. SeeKrim, supra note 141, 85, 110-11.
173. See Krim, supra note 141, at 110-11.
174. See Krim, supra note 141, at 110-11. Ms. Krim argues in her article that one effect of
such maximum security procedures is the widespread searching of women prisoners.
175. See Telephone Interview with Marjorie Rifkin, July 12, 1997.
176. See Herbert, supra note 141, at 1203-05.
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women's prisons.' Vocational programs, for example, rarely equal
those provided for men,178 often focusing on cosmetology and otherCwomen's professions."'7  The conditions of women's incarceration
appropriately has given rise to many equal protection and Title IX
suits. i °
F. Special Wards for Transgendered Prisoners
Another option for prison authorities charged with the safety and
well-being of a transgendered inmate would be to create special wards
for transgendered inmates, modeled on the gay wards that exist in
some jurisdictions. In preparing this article, I interviewed the public
relations officer of the New York City Department of Corrections. In
response to my query about whether there was transsexual housing, I
was asked, "what's the difference between transsexual and homosex-
ual?" 181 Indeed, upon further investigation, popular reports that a
transgendered ward existed on Riker's Island turned out to be false:
transgendered women are placed in the ward designed to house gay182
men. However, this 'gay' ward is thought by many to be a transgen-
dered ward.
The fact that prison authorities conflate transgenderism with
homosexuality requires closer attention. Given the high levels of male-
to-male sexual contact in prison, what makes a man seek special
housing based on sexual orientation? The answer, it would appear, is
that some prisoners feel unsafe in the general population because their
identity as gay men, as opposed to men who engage in same sex con-
duct, exposes them to violence. Indeed, it appears that those gay men
who seek such protection do so because their femininity, interpreted
as weakness in the prison context, places them at risk in the prison
population. This prevalence of conflationist attitudes in prisons ren-
ders the line between gay men and transgendered women nearly
indistinguishable.
Male-male sex in prison can further the conflation of transgen-
dered and gay identities. For example, some inmates in Riker's Island
177. See O'Brien, supra note 62, at 86-88.
178. See Herbert, supra note 141, at 1193-95; O'Brien, supra note 62, at 87.
179. See Herbert, supra note 141, at 1193-95; O'Brien, supra note 62, at 88.
180. See O'Brien, supra note 62, at 85.
181. Antenen Interview, supra note 120.
182. SeeAntenen Interview, supra note 120.
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who are effeminate men further their transformation in prison in or-
der to receive more attention and to heighten their attractiveness to
presumably heterosexual male inmates. 183 "Jockers," or "pitchers," the
dominant partner in a male-male sexual relationship, often encourage
their "punks" or "catchers" to be as feminine as possible to disguise
the homosexual nature of the relationship.' Such inmates call atten-
tion to the merging of transgendered and gay identities in the prison
context.
Specifically transgendered wards could look to gay housing that
exists in the New York City jail system as a model.'85 In that system,
prisoners who request such housing, and prisoners deemed to require
the protection afforded by such housing, are placed in the gay ward,
which has a limited capacity of approximately fifty.'86 Such housing
for transgendered people would undoubtedly provide them with a
space to express their gender identity freely. Rather than confront a
dangerous, and humiliating environment, transgendered inmates
would find a supportive, safe environment in which they would be
able to freely express their gender and continue to develop healthy
attitudes about their gender identity. This solution would cost little
more than the dedication of a separate ward to this purpose, a cost
that would obviously affect smaller prison systems more than those
with numerous transgendered prisoners.
If the transgendered population in a particular jurisdiction were
too small to constitute its own ward, states could pool resources with
other jurisdictions to provide joint resources.' 7 In this manner, one
jurisdiction's fair treatment of transgendered prisoners would permit
other jurisdictions to do so as well. In addition, by establishing special
wards, prisons could provide centralized services for transgendered
prisoners. Finally, the costs of such a program would in some sense be
lower than either placement of transgendered prisoners among their
initial sex or their goal gender identity, because the prison would not
have to manage the interaction between the transgendered and the
traditionally gendered prisoners.
183. See Gonnerman, supra note 149.
184. See Stephen Donaldson, The Deal Behind Bars, HARDER'S MAGAZINE, Aug. 1, 1996,
at 17.
185. SeeAntenen Interview, supra note 120.
186. SeeAntenen Interview, supra note 120.
187. See Rafter, supra note 145, at 31 (discussing pooling of resources to aid women in-
mates).
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In summary, there are several possibilities for corrections
authorities to improve placement options for transgendered prisoners.
Transgendered wards and placement based on gender identity would
improve upon the current system of genitalia-based placement. Each
reform entails particular advantages and costs, but all provide a vast
improvement over the dangerous and inhumane status quo placement
policy.
III. GENDER IDENTITY AS ILLNESS: TREATMENT
OF TRANSGENDERD PRISONERS
"Ifyou want to drive someone crazy, tell them they don't qualify
for treatment under a policy you don't have... That is
Kafkaesque, to put it mildly."
-U.S. Magistrate John F. Moulds
188
As detailed in Part I, there are many procedures transgendered
people undergo to transform their physical appearance. Continuing or
maintaining their transformation is of primary importance to incar-
cerated transgendered people. Yet the medicalization of
transgenderism has functioned as a double-edged sword for transgen-
dered prisoners. It gives them the tools with which to further their
transformation, but contemporaneously categorizes them as sick. This
section first outlines the theoretical problems with medicalization. It
then discusses the availability of and problems associated with the
medical and nonmedical treatments for transgendered prisoners.
A. The Diseasing of Gender Identity: Medicalization
and the Gender Binarism
Both inside and outside of prison, the classification of transgen-
derism as a medical phenomenon is currently dominant in both legal
consideration and legitimized gender transformation. This section
outlines the utility of medical discourse in attaining treatment for
transgendered people, including prisoners. This medicalization of
transgenderism reifies the notion that those outside of the gender bi-
188. Bernstein, supra note 153.
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narism are diseased. In the context of the prison environment, the
construction of transgendered people as diseased is compounded by
the high incidence of HIV.
1. The Usefulness of Medical Discourse
Medical discourse serves two purposes that may be useful in ad-
vocating for treatment for gender transformation: 1) to emphasize the
lack of choice in transgender identity that permits transgendered peo-
ple to receive necessary protection and treatment and 2) to categorize
transgendered people, especially prisoners, in terms of the treatment
they need and deserve. Transgendered people often invoke medical
definitions for their own benefit. First, transgendered people who un-
dergo hormonal treatment and sex reassignment surgery (unless they
use black market procedures), generally must have psychiatric and
medical evaluations. Precisely because of its expediency, transgendered
people maintain a strong investment in the continued existence of the
medicalization of transgenderism.
Due to financial requirements, the fulfillment of the surgical
dream is subject to cultural and class constraints; cosmetic
and genital conversion surgery is available primarily to the
middle and upper classes. Transsexuals, especially middle-
class pre-operative transsexuals, are heavily invested in
maintaining their status as "diseased" people. The demedi-
calization of transsexuality would further limit surgery in
this culture, as it would remove the label of "illness" and so
prohibit insurance companies from footing the bill. 9
The medicalization of transgenderism thus permits many to fulfill
their needs and goals in terms of their gender identity. Transgendered
prisoners especially rely on medicalization to justify the special treat-
ment they sometimes require. Medical discourse often sways courts.190
Transgendered people can simultaneously challenge authorities to
deal with the broader implications of transgendered people's existence
189. BORNSTEIN, supra note 4, at 119.
190. See Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408 (7th Cir. 1987); Phillips v. Michigan
Dep't of Corrections 731 F. Supp. 792, 792 (W.D. Mich. 1990); (two cases decided in
favor of transgendered prisoners). For further discussion of Marty Phillips's case, see
Sweeney, supra note 2, and Transsexml Prisoner Wins, NAT'L LAw J., Feb. 12, 1990, at 6.
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as they employ medical discourse to their advantage as needed. In
many of the cases involving transgendered prisoners, the plaintiff chal-
lenged legal enforcement of gender dichotomies but used medical
language as the basis of her argument.' In some cases (mainly non-prison
cases), excluding medical arguments might sometimes prove advanta-
geous. But prisoners are provided with so little non-medical assistance that
medicalization arguments may provide them with a foothold in a pro-
foundly unfriendly system. The categorization that medical discourse
permits has proven useful to prison authorities allocating treatment
resources. The occasional crossdresser may not require the same at-
tention to placement and treatment options as a post-operative
transgendered woman. Such categories have traditionally hierarchized
the transgendered in favor of those who have undergone the most
transformative change. Deconstructing the power of medical discourse
will thus need to be balanced against the interests of parties who use
such discourse to achieve their desired gender identity.
2. Gender as Illness
Medicalization, by constructing transgendered identity as an ill-
ness, reinforces the gender binarism. The provision of treatment
requires a prerequisite disease: gender dysphoria. 9 2 As one commen-
tator on a cholera epidemic observed, "I insist that 'disease' does not
exist. It is therefore illusory to think that one can 'develop beliefs'
about it to 'respond' to it. What does exist is not disease but prac-
tices." 93 As I argued in Part One, the reality of gender diversity
prevents the fair classification of any gender identity as per se diseased.
Because some conflicting trait combinations render people unable to
cope without intervention from skilled outsiders, medical discourse
overarchingly dominates all references to transgenderism. Yet, viewing
transgendered people as "gender dysphoric," and thus diseased, seems
antediluvian given the breadth of gender identity. The multiplicity of
gender identities requires no medical attention-people should not be
treated as diseased because of their gender identity. The continued
191. See, e.g., Meriwether, 821 F.2d at 411-13.
192. See Farmer v. Hawk-Sawyer, 69 F. Supp. 2d 120, 120 (D.D.C. 1999).
193. FRANcOis DELAPORTE, DISEASE AND CviLIZATION: THE CHOLERA IN PARS, 1832, at
6 (Arthur Goldberg trans., 1986), cited in DOUGLAS CmMp, AIDS: CULTURAL
ANALYsIs/CuLTURAL AcTvsM 3 (1988).
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viability of the gender binarism, so central to the structure of the
prison system, requires viewing those outside it as ill.
Not all medical intervention is benevolent, as the checkered his-
tory of psychiatry in dealing with transsexuals reveals. Some "cure
therapy" focuses on "conformity to cultural sex and gender stereotypes
... convincing transsexuals to accept gender roles 'congruent' with
their biological sex." 194 Such "cure" therapy obviously evokes its par-
allel in the "treatment of homosexuality," in which psychiatrists
constructed a science of homosexuality as illness and attempted to
treat or even cure gay men and lesbians of their homosexuality9  In-
deed, Gordene Olga MacKenzie asserts in her book Transgender
Nation that the medicalization of transsexualism reinforces gender
roles. "[I]n the techno-surgical process of [sex reassignment surgery],
not only are genitals amputated, manufactured and sold, but simulta-
neously, a gender ideology is manufactured, reinforced and
transmitted."'96 Although MacKenzie's interpretation has been chal-
lenged,9 7 the medical discourse used in case law generally relegates
transgenderism to the freakish discourse of medical oddities, fit only
for the stage of a Jerry Springer show. Rather than conceptualizing
gender accurately, courts generally, including the Farmer v. Brennan
court, have chosen to view transgendered people as victims of a "rare
disorder."'98
Couching language in medical discourse permits courts to avoid
dealing with gender identity's complexity in a direct manner, pre-
cluding recognition of the fluidity of gender identity. Such
medicalization limits the legitimate breadth of transgender identity, so
crossdressers who cannot demonstrate sufficient gender dysphoria
cannot benefit from legal protection for their transgenderism. Based
on this division between those who require medical treatment for
transgenderism and those who do not, all non-operative transgendered
people would be excluded from medical treatment, and thus from le-
gal categorization, as a transgendered person.
The medicalization of the transgendered classifies a whole people
as sick merely because of their nonmajoritarian composite of gender
194. MAcKENZIE, supra note 1, at 78-79.
195. See generally, MARTIN DUBERMAN, CURus (1991). The construction of homosexuality
as a disease has a long history.
196. MAcKENzIE, supra note 1, at 64.
197. See Denny, supra note 40.
198. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 829 (1994).
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traits. Viewing this medicalization in the confines of illness leaves the
transgendered not only needing medical attention, but deserving of
opprobrium. This identity leaves transgendered people outside of
those of good character, implying that they do not deserve the rights
granted to those who are of "healthy" character, deepening the ostra-
cism of prisoners.
Farmer v. Brennan demonstrates the degree to which gender
transformation has become entangled with medical discourse. Pre-
cisely because Justice Souter, adopting the Bureau of Prisons'
terminology, defined transsexualism as "[a] rare psychiatric disor-
der," 199 the prison's treatment of Ms. Farmer was found to violate the
Eighth Amendment's prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.
That condition placed her among vulnerable inmates, such as the
young or slight, for whose protection the prison system is responsible.
Had her "condition" been viewed as a choice, the harm she suffered
might be viewed, albeit erroneously, as her own responsibility. How-
ever, because of another reason, Ms. Farmer has been denied the
provision of hormone treatment: she is HIV-positive.
3. AIDS and Transgendered Prisoners
The notion that physical illness reflects spiritual illness and pun-
ishment for depravity became more accepted with the discovery of
AIDS. The broadening of the AIDS pandemic to all sectors of society
has not erased the notion that AIDS is punishment for diseased life-
styles. As one commentator noted, "[r]eading AIDS as the outward
and visible sign of an imagined depravity of will, AIDS commentary
deftly returns us to a premodern vision of the body, according to
which heresy and sin are held to be scored in the features of their vol-
untary subjects by punitive and admonitory manifestations of
disease." 200 Although HIV is not a venereal disease (since it may be
transmitted non-sexually),20' it evokes the depravity of syphilis, the
tortures of which, it was thought, were just dessert.2 2
199. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 829.
200. Simon Watney, The Spectacle ofAIDS, in THE LESBIAN AND GAY STUDIES READER,
supra note 59, at 202, 204.
201. See Watney, supra note 200.
202. Susan Sontag asserts that AIDS evokes an even more punitive notion of disease. See
SusAN SONTAG, AIDS AND ITS METAPHORS 26 (1988). Sontag's analysis of the meta-
phors AIDS raised received withering criticism from most AIDS activists and cultural
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The stigma of gender illness is thus compounded for many pris-
oners with the undeniable weight of AIDS phobia. Inmates with
HIV/AIDS2 3 face particular difficulties in their prison life. Prior in-
travenous drug abuse, unprotected anal intercourse, and needle
sharing among prisoners present corrections authorities with a grave
health problem. °' In 1992, the AIDS rate for prisoners was eleven
times that of the general population." 5 Furthermore, high numbers of
transgendered people have HIV/AIDS as a result of using black mar-
ket hormonal and surgical procedures and engaging in prostitution to
206fund those procedures. Many transgendered prisoners must cope
with HIV/AIDS in addition to the medical issues that come with
transgenderism. Transgendered prisoners with HIV/AIDS may expe-
rience particularly humiliating discrimination. Dana DeVilla, a
transgendered woman with HIV serving a mandatory sentence be-
cause of a second check-forgery offense, was forced to keep her
laundry and silverware separate from other inmates and faced bath-
room restrictions due to her health status, and guards openly
circulated the news of her HIV status and her transgender surgeries.2 7
She sued, but died before winning a $30,000 award. 8 One court
scholars for its failure to address the political nature of the pandemic, among other
points. See, e.g., D.A. Miller, Sontag's Urbanity, in THE GAY AND LESBIAN STUDIES
READER, supra note 59, at 212.
203. People who contract HIV experience various forms of opportunistic illnesses as a
result of their weakened immune system. Generally a diagnosis of AIDS(Acquired
Immune Deficiency Syndrome) coincides with severe weakening of the immune sys-
tem. See Joseph R. Masci, Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome (AIDS), in 2
ATTORNEYS' TEXTBOOK OF MEDICINE 46-1, J[ 46.00 (Roscoe N. Gray & Louise J.
Gordy eds., 1988).
204. See Theodore M. Hammett & Saira Moini, UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUsTICE, UP-
DATE ON AIDS IN PRISONS AND JAILS 1 (1990); James F. Homer, Jr., Constitutional
Issues Surrounding the Mass Testing and Segregation of HIV-Infected Inmates, 23 MUm-
PHIS ST. U. L. Rav. 369, 370 (1993).
205. See THEODORE M. HAMMETr ET AL., NATIONAL INST. OF JUST., 1992 UPDATE:
HIV/AIDS IN CoR.tcriONAL FACILrES 18 (1994); Deborah Dalrymple-Blackburn,
AIDS, Prisoners, and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 1995 UTAH L. Rav. 839.
206. See Interview with Nora Gabriela Molina, Newsline 8 (April 1996) [hereinafter
Molina Interview].
207. See Tom Buckham, HIV-Infected Inmate Claims Abuse by State Suit by Transsexual at
Albion Prison, BUFFALO NEws, June 6, 1993, available in 1993 WL 6094946
(documenting Ms. DeVilla's suit); Dan Herbeck, Estate of Transsexual with AIDS
Awarded $30,000 in Prison Suit, BUFFALO NEws, May 30, 1997, at B7 (documenting
award received by estate).
208. See Dan Herbeck, Estate of Transsexual with AIDS Awarded $30,000 in Prison Suit,
BUFFALO NEWS, May 30, 1997, at B7.
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subsequently found such disclosures to be unconstitutional. 209 Dee
Farmer, along with many other transgendered prisoners, has been de-
nied the right to work in certain areas of the prison and access to
210hormones because of her HIV status.
The construction of the illness and its moral dimension keeps
traditionally-gendered people from seeing the trials transgendered
people face. It is as if a miner, upon viewing a canary stricken by toxic
air, were to exclaim relief because the canary's illness stemmed not
from any general danger but from its own moral weakness. The con-
struction of transgendered identity as an illness forces transgendered
prisoners to present their gender identity as a sick one to qualify for
the treatment they deserve. Given that such a presentation of trans-
genderism as illness may only serve to reinforce the gender binarism's
hold, transgendered people may feel especially uncomfortable em-
bracing the label of illness to have their own needs met. Recognizing
the limits of medical discourse does not preclude its uses in certain
discrete contexts to achieve specific and limited goals, such as insur-
ance coverage and fair treatment by the courts. Nonetheless, the
stigma of "gender illness," compounded by that of AIDS phobia, leads
to a considerable distortion of the reality of transgendered lives as part
of the spectrum of gender diversity. This Part now turns to the spe-
cific needs of transgendered prisoners and how those needs may be
met or, more often, ignored by prison authorities.
209. See Powell v. Schriver, 175 F.3d 107, 113 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that prison em-
ployees cannot justify disclosing a prisoner's transgendered status).
210. See Farmer Interview, supra note 6.
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B. Physical Transformations
1. Surgery
"Someone eager to undergo this mutilation is plainly suffering
from a profound psychiatric disorder. "
-Seventh Circuit Chief Judge Posner
21 1
Courts generally do not require that a prison conduct any sur-
gery, either genital or nongenital, to further the transformation
process.212 As one prison official stated, "[w]e're not in the sex-change
business, per-se."213 This refusal is consistent with the general unavail-
211
ability of public monies for transgender surgery. Sex reassignment
surgery in many instances would be the obvious next step for trans-
gendered prisoners who are at advanced stages of gender
transformation at the time of their incarceration. One prisoner arrived
to serve her term already castrated, but was placed in a men's prison
because she still had a penis. 25 The prison hospital performed castra-
tion in only one case where a transgendered woman, placed in
segregation because of her femininity, repeatedly attempted to muti-
late her testicles. At one point she succeeded to the extent that the
hospital had to finish the job.21'6 Another transgendered woman, after
requests for sex reassignment surgery, electrolysis, cosmetic surgery,
hormonal therapy, cosmetics, and a transfer to a women's prison
failed, made four attempts at self-castration using razors, metal, and
glass.217 The vital importance of gender transformation for some
211. Maggert v. Hanks, 131 F.3d 670, 671 (7th Cir. 1997).
212. See, e.g., Marks, supra note 80 (discussing a transgendered prisoner who was denied a
requested Sex Reassignment Surgery).
213. Washington Department of Corrections Secretary Chase Riveland, quoted in Brock-
enbrough, supra note 105.
214. See Seth Jacobs, The Determination of Medical Necessity: Medicaid Funding for Sex-
Reassignment Surgery, 31 CAsE W. REs. L. Ray. 179 (1980).
215. Cynthia Chamnes underwent castration at age 20. See Prisoner Without a Gender
Poses ProblemsfrJailers, SAN FRAscisco CHRONICLE, May 21, 1985, at 18.
216. See Supre v. Ricketts, 792 F.2d 958, 960 (10th Cir. 1986).
217. See White v. Farrier, 849 F.2d 322, 323 (8th Cir. 1988). Ms. White was denied
treatment in part because authorities found her claims unconvincing because she
continued to wear a mustache. Subsequent to her suit, Ms. White was determined to
be a transsexual by four professionals. However, because the prison doctor's report
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transgendered people, faced with the refusal of authorities to attend to
their gender identity issues, will likely continue to lead them to at-
tempt to further their transformations themselves.
Many transgendered people who enter prison have not yet un-
dergone sex reassignment surgery or other surgery to further their
gender transformation. The optimal situation for transgendered peo-
ple would permit them to undergo the necessary surgery to achieve
the transformation needed for their mental health. Such transforma-
tion would require the same psychological treatment and support
services that it requires outside of prison. Certainly, prisons should
not attempt to reverse prisoners' own attempts at surgical transforma-
tion.
Though such provisions may be ideal, they would entail great
costs to the prison system. Although no penal interests would be
harmed by the availabiliry of such surgery, the notion that prisons
would pay for surgery such as mastectomy, phalloplasty, vaginoplasty,
and cosmetic surgery seems quite far-fetched, given that requests for
such expenses from public funds have historically been denied.2 8 One
transgendered woman in Canada expressed her opposition to the pro-
vision of sex reassignment surgery to prisoners, stating "[m]aybe all
transsexuals should commit a crime, go to jail, and receive our treat-
ments at the expense of taxpayers." 29 As Judge Posner stated, "[w] e do
not want transsexuals committing crimes because it is the only route
to obtaining a cure... making the treatment a constitutional duty of
prisons would give prisoners a degree of medical care that they could
not obtain if they obeyed the law.
"210
Despite the fact that nobody would suffer prison life in order to
get a sex-change, prisons still need to evaluate how to minimize such
costs. First, prison systems could seriously limit the number of trans-
gendered people who have access to such surgery by requiring that the
prisoner demonstrate a high degree of transformation before entering
prison. Second, strict enforcement of the requirement of long-term
psychological care would probably limit the number of candidates.
Third, though of far less utility to most prisoners, prisons could re-
quire prisoners to contribute to the cost of such surgery, either by
did not exhibit deliberate indifference to the prisoner's condition, Ms. White lost her
suit.
218. See Marks, supra note 80.
219. Katie Thomas, Treatment Unequal, CALGARY HERALD, Dec. 20, 1996, at A20.
220. Maggert v. Hanks, 131 F.3d 670, 672 (7th Cir. 1997).
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payment from their families or by garnishing post-release wages. In
one case, a prisoner offered to pay for her sex reassignment surgery if
she could subsequently be housed in a women's prison, but was de-
nied. z21 Given the lack of financial resources available to most
prisoners, most transgendered prisoners would still face the prospect
of years of suffering an incomplete transformation z22
The slim possibility that any of these reforms, even the last one,
would be adopted reflects the extent to which transgendered prisoners'
problems emblematize the broader failure of prisons to accommodate
the mental and physical health needs of all prisoners. The fact that
barbaric autotransformative acts even occur typifies the insouciant
attitude of prison authorities to the real health of those under their
charge.
2. Hormonal Transformation
Transgendered people in transformation need to continue their
hormonal treatments in prison. Hormone provision is only available
to transgendered women, since hormones for transgendered men still
entail questions of medical safety.22 As the Tenth Circuit noted, the
law of most circuits does not require prisons to provide hormones to
transgendered prisoners. 224 Nonetheless, the policy of the United
States Bureau of Prisons is to provide hormones to transgendered
women prisoners in order to maintain, rather than advance or reduce,
transgender attributes.225 However, because the prison has an interest
in the maintenance of the gender binarism, men's prisons will deny
estrogen to transgendered women in order to keeps the men's prison
"male."226 Even if the prison provides hormones, it does not guarantee
that they will be provided at the appropriate levels and with the neces-
sary physical and psychological support services. For example, one
221. See McKay, supra note 121.
222. See McKay, supra note 121.
223. See Compton Interview, supra note 51.
224. See Brown v. Zavaras, 63 F.3d 967 (10th Cir. 1995).
225. See Murray v. United States Bureau of Prisons, No. 95-5204, 1997 WL 34677, at *3
(6th Cir. Jan. 10, 1997); Farmer v. Hawk-Sawyer, 69 F. Supp. 2d. 120 (D.D.C.
1999). Hormones are also provided in Canada, at least in Alberta Province. See
Mario Toneguzzi, Taxpayers Picking Up Cheque fr Inmate's Sex Change, MP Says,
EDMONTON J., Dec. 14, 1996, at A3.
226. Richard F. Storrow, Naming the Grotesque Body in the 'Nascent Jurisprudence of
Transsexualism," 4 MicH. J. GENDER & L. 275, 308-09 (1997).
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community mental health provider in New York asserts that, although
hormones are freely available in local prisons, adequate medical and
psychological supervision is not.z27
Hormonally-treated transgendered people experience serious
health problems with any cessation, reduction, or irregularity of hor-
monal treatment. Furthermore, after their incarceration hormone
therapy requires close monitoring for side effects such as liver damage,
as well as counseling to ensure that the transgendered person fully un-
derstands and is adapting to the provision of hormones. The provision
of hormone therapy thus requires an array of psychological and medi-
cal services. Some prisoners may lie about previous hormone
therapy,22 and the common use of black market hormone treatments
means that a prisoner's lack of medical records of hormone therapy
cannot be taken as conclusive. Prison doctors should perform careful
physical examinations, and for prisoners who had not taken hormones
before their incarceration, the prisoner should see a psychologist for
several months to assess the appropriateness of hormone treatments.
The cost of hormone treatment, while expensive, does not exceed
the costs of other routine medical treatments administered to the gen-
eral prison population. The administration of hormones should be
based on need and not a lack of resources. However, in New York,
reputedly one of the more liberal states 'in this country, a backlash has
developed against "coddling" transgendered prisoners. Two state rep-
resentatives separately proposed ending funding of hormone
treatments.22 9 One stated, "There is an anything-goes approach in our
prisons, "2'° objecting to the $9,000 annual cost of hormone provision
per prisoner. This opposition is representative of the potential oppo-
sition to hormone and other treatment provision in other states.
The appropriate provision of hormones with the requisite medi-
cal and psychological support seems far-fetched for a system that so
profoundly ignores the needs of trangendered prisoners. The Federal
Bureau of Prisons' seemingly humane policy of maintaining hormone
levels is an empty promise for the many transgendered prisoners who
227. See Warren Interview, supra note 81. Dr. Warren pointed out that after leaving
prison, some transgendered people have a hard time finding the resources to continue
their transformation.
228. See Gonnerman, supra note 149, at 48 (describing one transgendered prisoner who
lied about prior usage of hormones to obtain hormones in a New York prison).
229. See Duggan, supra note 83 (discussing upstate New York legislator Michael Noz-
zolio's opposition to estrogen treatments).
230. Michael Nozzolio, quoted in Duggan, supra note 83.
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suffer the cruelly irregular provision of indispensable hormones. Many
transgendered prisoners who are denied hormone treatment in prison
experience grave effects, not only in their physical gender but in their
health.23' In addition to the return of facial hair growth and male pat-
tern baldness, surface fat recedes, creating a markedly changed gender
appearance 2 and leaving transgendered prisoners "trapped in a neth-
erworld between manhood and womanhood. " 33 The net effect is that
the prisoner feels like she is being turned into "a sideshow freak."2
4
Given the shocking effects of ending hormone therapy, prison
authorities should at least ensure provision to those who have already
begun hormone therapy. In Murray, the prisoner had been provided
with hormones below the level received before entering prison. The
prison doctor, despite notification of the error, refused to increase the
dosage. The Court "was reluctant to second-guess that judgment."235
In another example, a transgendered prisoner experienced severe
withdrawal symptoms, and although she had offered to pay for the
hormones and to release the Department of Corrections from liability,
the prison doctor refused to provide the hormonal therapy. 2 Another
transgendered prisoner suffered significant tissue reduction around her
breasts, which caused bruising.' 7 Lack of estrogen caused periods of
vomiting and depression and reversed many of the feminine charac-
teristics she had attained during seventeen years of gender
transformation. Wanton irrationality may often rule the prison's
treatment of the transgendered prisoner: one prison hospital com-
pleted an attempted self-castration, but then ordered testosterone
replacement therapy, against the prisoner's will. A court subsequently
ordered the prison to provide estrogen treatments.
231. For example, Michelle Stokes experienced a great deal of physical trauma as a result
of the withdrawal of hormone treatment. See Green, supra note 6.
232. See, e.g., Sweeney, supra note 2 (discussing the physical and emotional changes un-
dergone by Marty Phillips during her incarceration); see also, Farmer Interview, supra
note 6.
233. Sweeney, supra note 2.
234. Sweeney, supra note 2.
235. Murray v. United States Bureau of Prisons, No. 95-5204, 1997 WL 34677, at *3
(6th Cir. Jan. 10, 1997).
236. See Meriwether v. Faulkner, 821 F.2d 408, 410 (7th Cir. 1987).
237. See Phillips v. Michigan Dep't of Corrections, 731 F. Supp. 792, 794 (W.D. Mich.
1990).
238. See Supre v. Ricketts, 792 F.2d 958, 960-61 (10th Cir. 1986). Shortly thereafter the
plaintiff's sentence was commuted by Colorado's governor, liberating Ms. Supre to
pursue her gender identity freely.
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The high incidence of HIV among prisoners also complicates the
provision of hormones to prisoners.239 Many prisons do not provide
hormones to seropositive transgendered people because of the poten-
tial aggravation of HIV-related conditions.240 Ms. Farmer, for
example, currently cannot receive hormones because the Bureau of
Prisons has defined her as having AIDS." ' One counter-example is the
New York City Health and Hospitals Corporation, which administers
medical care for city jails, provides hormones to all inmates who had
been taking hormones prior to their entry into jail, regardless of their
HIV status.242 Given the weak support HIV-positive prisoners receive
generally, the humane management of transgendered prisoners' HIV
status and their hormone treatments would appear beyond the capac-
ity of many prison systems.
243
C. Nonmedical Gender Transformation
Your Vanna White days are over!
-Prison Guard to Transgendered Woman Prisoner2"
Cosmetics and clothing are an essential aspect of a transgendered
person's mental health.245 Since such a large part of gendered self-
presentation lies in one's clothing and, in the case of transgendered
women, cosmetics, the provision or deprivation of such items play a
large role in the mental health of a transgendered person. Prisoners
should be provided with appropriate undergarments, cosmetics, and
clothing, or allowed to procure them from outsiders.246 The depriva-
tion of appropriate clothing and cosmetics for transgendered people
239. See Dalrymple-Blackburn, supra note 205, at 839.
240. See Farmer v. Haas, 990 F.2d 319 (7th Cir. 1993); Molina Interview, supra note
206.
241. See Farmer Interview, supra note 6.
242. See Compton Interview, supra note 51.
243. See Farmer Interview, supra note 6.
244. Beyerlein, supra note 136; see alo, Transsexual Inmate Sues ]r Rights, supra note 136
(discussing Ms. Pollock's case further).
245. See, e.g., Claybrooks v. Tennessee Dep't. of Corrections, 182 F.3d 916 (6th Cir.
1999); Houston, supra note 82 (discussing transgendered woman inmate Shelby
Cox's requests for cosmetics).
246. Many prisoners request access to cosmetics and perfume. See, e.g., Beyerlein, supra
note 244 (stating that Ms. Pollock had requested makeup and perfume).
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could disturb the mental well-being of a transgendered inmate by
forcing her to appear as her initial gender. Cosmetics and women's
clothing already form part of the contraband that circulates in a men's
prison.247 One prisoner needed a brassiere to serve as an undergarment
for her breasts.4 Her doctor, however, "admitted that he denied
plaintiffs request for a brassiere, stating 'I do not buy bras."' 29Jean-
nie Marie Druley, an advanced pre-operative transgendered woman,
had her padded bras taken away from her upon incarceration.250 The
correctional officer stated that the bras were not men's clothing and
insisted that they would treat "him" like "everyone else." 251 In another
case, the principal issue concerned cosmetics and clothing: a 61-year-
old transgendered woman had been permitted shortly after her incar-
ceration in 1964 to crossdress in prison, with feminine clothing and
make-up 252 including the use of three-inch fake fingernails, garter
belts, stockings and other undergarments. In 1981, a Parole Board
member complained about the prisoner's dress, and prison officials
responded by strictly enforcing standard male attire for all prisoners.253
Nonetheless, she tried to circumvent restrictions, using writing pencils
as eye-liner and chalk as rouge and wearing her prison uniform in a
feminine manner,2  all common practices.' In both these cases, the
transgendered prisoner had requested and been denied women's cos-
metics and clothing. While the former case succeeded, the latter failed
both at the district and circuit courts.256 Thus, clothing and cosmetics,
like transformative procedures, may be provided only when a medical
need has been established. It would seem to be the norm that trans-
gendered people would be denied the accessories necessary for their
.gender identity.
247. See Gonnerman, supra note 149, at 49 (describing the provision of women's clothing
and cosmetics by guards).
248. See Phillips v. Michigan Dep't. of Corrections, 731 F. Supp. 792, 794 (W.D. Mich.
1990).
249. Phillips, 731 F. Supp. at 794.
250. For a discussion of Ms. Druley's criminal appeal, see New Sentence Refused in Slaying,
TULSA TRIB. & TuLSA WORLD, Aug. 6, 1994, at N15.
251. Marks, supra note 80.
252. SeeLongv. Nix, 86 F.3d 761,763 (8th Cit. 1996).
253. See Long, 86 F.3d at 763.
254. See Long, 86 F.3d at 763.
255. See Gonnerman, supra note 149, at 50 (describing use of Vaseline, Kool-Aid, and
pencils as cosmetics in prison); Farmer Interview, supra note 6.
256. See Long, 86 F.3d at 766; Phillips v. Michigan Dep't. of Corrections, 731 F. Supp.
792, 801 (W.D. Mich. 1990).
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At most, the cost of such provision is minimal. In prisons where
placement arrangements have been made for transgendered inmates,
the provision of clothing and cosmetics would cause no disruption.
The challenging consideration arises where prisons have made no
separate accommodation for transgendered inmates. For transgen-
dered people placed with their initial gender, the provision of
appropriately gendered clothing and cosmetics might be seen by
prison authorities as potentially disruptive. This sentiment would be
difficult to counter, since such authorities often fail to provide other
provisions for transgendered people. It may be argued that the strong
need of transgendered prisoners outweighs, at least partially, the dis-
order caused by a lack of gender uniformity in the appearance of the
inmates.
Transgendered prisoners, like all transgendered people, may re-
quire a great deal of medical, psychological, and other support. It is
incumbent upon prison authorities to provide these materials and
services to permit transgendered inmates to live in the gender identity
they choose.
References to psychological treatment pepper this section for a
good reason: psychological support services for transgendered inmates
serve a crucial dual function in the prison context. First, such support
services assist transgendered people to maintain the mental fortitude
required to decide to undergo and to cope with gender transforma-
tion,257 because, as one court noted, it is not uncommon for
individuals with gender identity disorder to become depressed, have
suicidal tendencies, or attempt autocastration.2" Although some trans-
gendered people may undergo their transformations without the
assistance of psychologists and therapists, access to these services can
greatly facilitate the process of transformation. Second, these such
services prevent abuses of the provision of gender transformation pro-
cedures by prisoners who may not have fully considered their gender
transformation. The cost of such services to the prison may be high,
given that a psychologist would require some degree of special training
to deal with the difficult issues of gender identity in a sensitive man-
ner. Psychologists could serve the role of preventing costs of gender
transformations from spiraling out of control by requiring inmates to
257. See, e.g., Green, supra note 6 (discussing self mutilation that resulted from the lack of
estrogen treatment).
258. See Farmer v. Hawk-Sawyer, 69 F. Supp. 2d 120, 122 (D.D.C. 1999).
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make the necessary mental commitment to transformation before un-
dergoing the physical procedures.
In conclusion, treatment issues plague transgendered prisoners
nearly as much as, if not more than, placement issues. The two issues
reveal the grave nature of the daily lives of transgendered prisoners,
and the potential for improving their lives. The lesson offered by
transgendered prisoners lies not only in improving their lives but un-
derstanding why the problems they face epitomize those faced by all
members of society.
IV. MINERS' CANARIES AND THE RIGHT TO GENDER IDENTITY
Closely observing the problems facing transgendered prisoners,
one might feel confused and daunted by the myriad issues raised. The
miners' canary allegory focuses our attention toward the dilemma
raised by this article: what does the suffering of transgendered prison-
ers mean for those outside that dual imprisonment? This Part first
explores the significance of this allegory for minority-majority rela-
tions. I then argue that the most visible lesson to draw from the
experience of transgendered prisoners is the necessity for the estab-
lishment of a right to gender identity.
A. Transgendered Prisoners: The Ultimate Miner's Canaries
A scholar of native American issues applied the miner's canary
allegory, stating: "[I] ike the miner's canary, the Indian marks the shifts
from fresh air to poison gas in our political atmosphere; and our
treatment of Indians ... reflects the rise and fall in our democratic
faith." 259 The allegory of the miner's canary provides us with a useful
lens through which to view minority/majority relations.
259. Felix S. Cohen, The Erosion of Indian Rights, 1950-53: A Case Study in Bureaucracy,
62 YALE L.J. 348, 390 (1953).
260. See, e.g., NILEs ELDREDGE, THE MINER'S CANARY: UNRAVELING THE MYSTERIES OF
EXNcrioN (1991) (discussing the miner's canary in the context of widespread dis-
appearance of species); Ann Lewis, Speaking for Ourselves, 38 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV.
125 (1994)(discussing women as the miner's canary of the American economy, first
to feel the "ill winds."); Rennard Strickland, Indian Law and the Miner's Canary. The
Signs ofPoison Gas, 39 CGuv. ST. L. REv. 483 (1991).
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1. Transgendered Prisoners, Multiply Oppressed
Transgendered prisoners' lives reflect the nature of multiply-
oppressed identities in which the particularized nature of the oppres-
sion commingles with other oppressions to constitute a graver form of
victimization. Dee Farmer demonstrates the range of oppressions
faced by transgendered prisoners. A 22-year old pre-operative trans-
gendered woman serving a twenty year sentence for credit card fraud,
she was transferred by prison officials as a disciplinary measure to the
all-male maximum security U.S. Penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana.
Prison officials did so despite their knowledge of Ms. Farmer's prior
segregation for her protection and despite the extremely violent nature
of the maximum security prison. Within two weeks, Ms. Farmer
claimed she had been brutally raped and beaten. 261 Ms. Farmer sued
the prison for cruel and unusual punishment, and convinced the Su-
preme Court to reverse the Circuit's affirmance of the dismissal of her262
case. But Ms. Farmer's woes go far beyond the rough treatment rec-
ognized by the high court: she has suffered discrimination and
mistreatment on many fronts and has persistently attempted to hold
prison officials accountable for her troubles.263 Twice she was success-
ful in her prior suits to obtain estrogen, which prison officials had
refused to provide.2 c  She sued prison officials for denying her work
opportunities due to her infection with HIV.265 In addition to her
suits on these transgender issues, Ms. Farmer sued to challenge disci-26626
plinary measures and the fairness of her sentence.21 Ms. Farmer's
261. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 830 (1994).
262. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 848-51.
263. See Farmer Interview, supra note 6.
264. See Farmer v. Morirsugu, 163 F.3d 610 (D.C.Cir. 1998); Farmer v. Haas, 990 F.2d
319 (7th Cir. 1993); Farmer v. Haas, 927 F.2d 607 (7th Cir. 1991); Farmer v.
Hawk-Sawyer, 69 F.Supp.2d 120, 120 (D.D.C. 1999).
265. See Farmer v. Moritsugu, 742 F. Supp. 525 (W.D.Wis. 1990) (challenging work
restrictions preventing her from food work because she was HIV positive); see also,
Farmer v. Hawk, No. 94-CV-2274, 1996 WL 525321 (D.D.C. Sept. 5, 1996)
(challenging prison's policy for HIV positive inmates).
266. Ms. Farmer challenged punitive measures taken after she was caught having sex in
public in the prison. See Farmer v. Cowan, 958 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1992).
267. See Farmer v. Circuit Court of Md. for Baltimore County, 31 F.3d 219, 221-22 (4th
Cir. 1994); United States v. Farmer No. 92-6929, 1993 WL 51700, at *1 (4th Cir.
Feb. 22, 1993); In re Farmer, 888 F.2d 1385 (4th Cir. 1989); Farmer v. Brannon,
No. 88-7224, 1988 WL 138724, at *1 (4th Cir. Dec. 21, 1988); Farmer v. Meese,
Civ. A.No. 88-206, 1988 WL 9587 (D.D.C. Jan. 29, 1988).
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battles suggest the breadth and severity of the problems facing trans-
gendered prisoners.
a. Intersectionality and Cosynthesis
Intersectionality, the theory that multiply-subjugated persons
who face a more virulent form of oppression often slip through thet- 2681
cracks of antidiscrimination remedies, also informs the position of
transgendered prisoners as miners' canaries. As I have argued previ-
ously, queer identity, which encompasses people subordinated for
their sexual and/or gender identities, is fundamentally intersectional,
due to the variegated discriminations most queers face-"as women,
as people of color, as poor people, as cross-gendered people, ... as
sexual subversives,"2 69 and as HIV-positive people. Transgendered
prisoners confront all that and the opprobrium of the criminal justice
system.
The multiply-subordinate positions occupied by transgendered
people position them as the paradigmatic miners' canaries. First,
transgendered people simultaneously subvert the stability of both
their original and target genders, exploding the two-sexed assump-
tion. Second, transgendered people, in challenging the meaning of
sexual and gender identity, often find their needs conflated with les-
bian and gay people. Although many transgendered people are indeed
lesbian or gay, the conflation of transgendered identity with these
"sexual orientation" categories reveals profound misunderstandings
about the nature of and the relationship between sex and gender
practice and identity.270 Consequently, transgendered people often
268. See Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black
Feminist Critique ofAntidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory, and Antiracist Poli-
tics, 1989 U. CHi. LEGAL F. 139, 140.
269. Darren Rosenblum, Note, Queer Intersectionality and the Failure of Recent Lesbian and
Gay "Victories," 4 L. & SExuALIT 83, 89 (1994).
270. Contemporary Euro-American society conflates sex, gender, and sexual orientation,
signifying elements of one into those of another. First, the conflation of sex with
gender implies that wherever certain physical traits exist, a certain gender must also
exist. As demonstrated above, the physical traits that affect gender identity are quite
numerous and the psychosocial elements of gender identity are strong. Second, the
conflation merges gender with sexual orientation and equates "queers" (gay men)
with "sissies" (effeminate men) and "dykes" (lesbians) with "tomboys" (masculine
women). Third, sex is conflated with sexual orientation, so one's sexual orientation is
assumed based on the sex identity of oneself and one's partner. The gender binarism
incorporates the conflation of sex with gender and the mistaken bifurcation of essen-
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face heterosexism regardless of their sexual orientation. Third, many
transgendered people have identities that belong to more widely rec-
ognized subordinate groups, notably those constructed around race
and class. Given the concentration of racial and ethnic minorities in
prisons and the extent to which those imprisoned come from poorer
backgrounds, these subordinations affect most transgendered prison-
ers. Fourth, society directs its daily devaluation of "deviants" at
transgendered prisoners. Often, their imprisonment stems from
crimes related to their gender identity or even from the criminaliza-
tion of their gender identity.271 Many must engage in sex work or theft
to arrange payment for their gender transformations. In fact, in several
cases involving transgendered prisoners, the inmate had been arrested
while committing theft27 or prostitution 27 to acquire money to fur-
ther their transformation. Finally, the conflation of these subordinate
identities in this particular era creates a group with an unusually high
incidence of HIV, with the concomitant ostracism, even within the
prison, and the peculiar health problems facing transgendered seropo-
sitive inmates. Seropositivity in the context of an already highly-
medicalized transgendered identity only furthers their categorization
as "sick."
b. Cosynthesis
The presence of all these categories in particular individuals calls
into question the viability of such discrete categories: transgendered
prisoners are stuck in a crisis of category. Far more relevant than this
pile of categories is the interconnected functioning of such identities
and the discrimination against them. The difficult task of discerning
the source of particular wrongs loses its relevance against the pains of
tially multiple genders. Transgendered people "refuse, in highly pronounced ways, to
obey the conflation of sex, gender, and sexual orientation." Valdes, supra note 60, at
273.
271. One commentator demonstrates the extent to which the law has criminalized trans-
gendered identity itself. See Shafiqullah, supra note 27, at 201-09, 226-27.
272. See Prisoner Without a Gender, supra note 215 (detailing the problems facing Cynthia
Chamnes, a transgendered prisoner incarcerated for bank robbery that she and her
lover committed to further her gender transformation, reminiscent of the Al Pacino
film, DOG DAY AFrERNOON (Artists Entertainment Complex 1975)).
273. Dee Wakefield worked as a prostitute to earn money for her transformation. She also
claims that her imprisonment was related to her transgendered identity, since she was
imprisoned for killing a sexually abusive uncle. See Cohen, supra note 46.
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daily life for transgendered prisoners. Peter Kwan describes the dy-
namic interconnectedness among such identities as "cosynthesis."
274
Multiply-subjugated identities place their subjects in particular social
positions that highlight the connections between progressive change
for one subjugated group and another. The amalgam of these identi-
ties places transgendered prisoners in a uniquely restraining web of
oppressions. Without certain sets of hierarchical and sometimes dis-
criminatory practices, each aspect of their identities-race, class,
criminal "deviance," and HIV status-would not impact their lives in
the same fashion.
Although an extensive body of literature documents the undenia-
bly profound consequences of each of these identities, a full account
of the combination of these identities has yet to be performed. The
exposition of the travails of transgendered prisoners presents a snap-
shot of the contours of such a full accounting. Most notable is the
manner in which the set of subordinate identities interacts to worsen
the lives of these subjects. Identities interact with each other, con-
structing a closely-intertwined series of oppressions.
As we have seen, many transgendered people feel a strong ur-
gency to further their transformation. If their class position does not
permit them to pursue this change through legitimate processes, their
limited economic opportunities may lead them to prostitution or theft
to attain their goal. The socioeconomic situation of people of color
serves as yet another oppressive aspect of their lives. Without any
health insurance, people in these situations may resort to the use of
black market hormones and surgery. The prostitution and the black
market transformations, the very activity engaged to further their
transformation, might lead them to yet another subjugated identity:
HIV positivity. In prison, the HIV status itself may prevent their ac-
cess to continued hormone provision necessary for the maintenance of
their transformation. Another connection is that between sexual ori-
entation and transgenderism-those attracted to people of another sex
might undertake transformation to become the same sex as the object
of their attraction, rendering them gay or lesbian. These connections
only suggest further and deeper combinations of oppressions that
merit further attention.
274. See Peter Kwan, Invention, Inversion and Intervention: The Oriental Woman in The
World of Suzie Wong, Madame Butterfly and The Adventures of Priscilla, Queen of
the Desert, 5 AsiAN L. J. 99 (1998).
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As a miner's canary who lives or dies as evidence of a dangerous
atmosphere, transgendered prisoners, with their identity, security, and
health, reveal the gender binarist plague that afflicts all. Placed as a
test of the viability of an environment, the details of transgendered
prisoners' abject victimization sans cesse serve as a roadmap of the
wages of the gender binarism and of other categorizations. The result
of this concoction of scorn and incomprehension yields profoundly
disturbing mistreatment. Transgendered prisoners find themselves
placed in housing among "men" or "women," subject to violence and
sexual abuse based on their deviant status even among the prisoners.
This housing decision reflects the gender binarism magnified into a
cruel lunacy. Prisons often withhold the treatment required by trans-
gendered people to maintain their gender identity. The lack of
treatment reified the gender binarism, denying the transgendered the
fruits of a transformation crucial to their mental health.
2. The Miners' Canary: A Closer Look
Upon closer examination, three relevant elements of the allegory
appear: the act of placement in the cage in the mine; the suffering un-
dergone by the canary subsequent to its placement; and the
observation and consequent utility of the canary for the miners. These
elements represent the subjugation of the outcast by the empowered,
the useful suffering of the outcast, and the understanding stemming
from that suffering. Fleshing out the metaphor's three elements fur-
ther demonstrates how viewing specific problems through the lens of
the miners' canary phenomenon reveals a contextualized, multi-
perspectival understanding of the subject at hand.
a. The Miners' Placement of the Canary
Placing the canary required observation of visual and aural alert-
ness: if the miners failed to notice the illness of the bird, the ceased
chirping certainly would get the miners' attention. Placing a being in
danger to evaluate whether that danger might be mortal is an inten-
tional act. The most tenuous aspect of the allegory is the majority's
responsibility for the minority's suffering. The problem is one of
agency-those in a majority cannot necessarily be considered to have
directly committed the action of placing minority lives in danger.
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Rather than transpose the miners' image onto specific personalities, it
is more compelling to view the forces of subordination as the miners.
Although individuals certainly exercise power in causing the various
arbitrary subordinations that plague our society, one must first inquire
how the power to subordinate is exercised. The source of such power
may be difficult to locate since the sources of institutional power not
only reside in the actors participating, but also in the Society that le-
gitimizes that institution. 275 Power thus does not merely express itself
through the most notable actions of violence, but through the most
subtle of exercises as well.
The hazard of such a notion of power, though, is to ascribe such
power to individuals rather than structures: That such undeniable
subordination exists does not permit one to infer that every individual
bears responsibility for the subordination. Simply because collective
structures of the empowered place subordinated people into positions
of danger, this causation cannot be universalized into intentions on
the part of the constituent members of the empowered classes. Violent
acts may indicate such individual responsibility, but institutional vio-
lence cannot be imputed to all members of particular classes.
Thus, although the miners unquestionably placed canaries in
mortal danger for their own benefit, I would not assert that prison
authorities always place transgendered prisoners in their particularly
toxic positions with intent. Rather, the "deliberate indifference" stan-
dard by which courts sanction prison authorities for many
Constitutional violations against prisoners 76 actually does approxi-
mate the level of intentionality and violence of the miner at times.
The study of transgendered prisoners' conditions inculpates the forces
275. Gilles Deleuze, reading Michel Foucault, provides an unusually cogent perspective on
the exercise of power and its distinction from violence:
The relationship of forces singularly exceeds violence, and cannot define it-
self by it. It is that violence weighs on bodies, objects or determined beings
of which it destroys or changes the form, while force has no other object
other than other forces, without other being but the relationship: it's 'an
action on an action, on eventual actions, or present, future or presented
[actions],' it is 'an ensemble of actions on possible actions.' One then can
conceive a list, necessarily open, of variables expressing a relationship of
forces or of power, constituting actions on actions: to incite, to induce, to
avert, to make easy or difficult, to expand or limit, to make more or less
probable.
GiuaS DELEUZE, FOUCAuLT 77 (Les editions de Minuit, 1986) (translation mine).
276. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 835 (1994).
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which control transgendered prisoners' lives rather than the individu-
als who exercise power over them.
b. The Canary's Suffering
As the nature of the canary's suffering provides the miner with
information, so the minority's suffering and its perspective acquires
greater relevance. This perspective is illuminated by a scene in Gilda,
the 1946 film noir,27 in which a servant pointedly notes that his view,
the worm's eye view, is the ground level truth in all its ugliness. This
view approximates that of the canary or the transgendered prisoner.
Epistemologically, such a perspective provides the opportunity to
understand the unmitigated effects of exercises of power. A close ex-
amination of the horrors of daily life as a transgendered prisoner
reveals the process by which the canary is killed, as it were. The
"worm s eye view" serves a crucial function: it is only through such a
vantage point that the knowledge of such difficulties will be spread
and people will be motivated to promote change. Transgendered pris-
oners face a broad range of deleterious situations, ranging from the
potentially fatal to more subtle and quotidian ignominies, and only by
understanding such experiences can we promote change. As Susan
Sturm points out, "[t]he pressure to respond to concerns of excluded
groups disrupts patterns of organizational inertia, and creates an op-
portunity to take from the margins and rethink the whole." 78 The
intent observation of such travails can prove fruitful: the details re-
vealed through such careful attention likely will elaborate the
understanding we obtain from the miners' perspective.
277. In the film, one character alone sees everything that occurs, relishes the knowledge it
provides him, and on occasion, imparts wisdom upon the fools around whom the
drama swirls. This character is Uncle Plo, the washroom attendant/personal assistant,
and one of the few Hispanic characters in this drama of expatriates in a Buenos Aires
casino. Uncle Plo brings in Glenn Ford's character's shined shoes and offers to put
them on his feet. "For how much," inquires Ford. Replies Pfo, kneeling to perform
his duty, "The charge is slight because I find this always a revealing vantage point.
The worm's eye view is so often the true one." GILDA, (Columbia Pictures 1946).
278. Susan P. Sturm, From Gladiators to Problem-Solvers: Connecting Conversations about
Women, the Academy, and the Legal Profession, 4 DutcK J. GENDER L. & PoL'y 119,
126 (1997) [hereinafter Sturm, Gladiators].
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c. The Miners' Understanding
The canary's death in the mine is no snuff film: the miner ob-
serves the suffering and death not for her own pleasure, but for signs
of her own potential demise at the very toxic fumes that killed the ca-
nary. Although the miner may not identify with the canary, she does
identify with a danger faced by the canary. This most crucial aspect of
the miners' canary metaphor reveals the broader implications of par-
ticular subordinations. Susan Sturm elaborates on the metaphor with
regard to women and other minority groups, commenting that
"[w]hen they fail to thrive in particular institutions, their experience is
often a signal of a more general or systemic problem that affects a much
larger group." 279 Scholarship related to the miners' canary allegory em-
phasizes in particular the value of the miners' understanding that the
troubles of the subordinate people can instruct positive change. 20 The
279. Sturm, Gladiators, supra note 278, at 126.
280. As Lani Guinier noted, commenting on the ubiquity of standardized tests, "[tihe
impact of the testocracy on people of color tells more than a history of racial exclu-
sion. It also functions like a miners' canary, the bird miners brought into the mine to
signal the shift from fresh air to poisonous gas. The canary is alerting us to a much
larger problem in the distribution of opportunity in higher education." Susan P.
Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Miner's Canary 1 (on file with author); see also, Susan
Sturm & Lani Guinier, The Future of Affirmative Action: Reclaiming the Innovative
Ideal, 84 CALiF. L. REv. 953 (1996). -
Lani Guinier has also used the metaphor of the miners' canary to address the is-
sues of democracy in the way that Felix Cohen did: that the lack of democracy for
racial and ethnic minorities evidenced a flaw in the overall democratic structure. See
Lani Guinier, The Miner's Canary: Race and the Democratic Process, DissENT, Fall
1995, at 521, 522. Guinier has also used this argument in her article with Gerald
Torres, The Miner's Canary: Race, Representation and the USA Experience: Under-
standing the Meaning and Uses oftolitical Synecdoche (unpublished manuscript on file
with author).
Similarly, it has been argued that the blacks serve as miners' canaries in terms of
socio-economic developments such as unwed and working mothers, and that white
problems follow those affecting blacks, and that black problems thus merit the atten-
tion of whites before they overtake whites.
Blacks have often said that we are the canaries in the mine of American so-
ciety. This was true for drug use which was originally confined to the black
community and which has spread throughout our society. It was also true
for illegitimate births which are now so prevalent in all races. It is true in
terms of married women working outside the home, which was virtually
unheard of among whites years ago although it was quite common among
blacks. The lifestyles that blacks lead today may be the lifestyles that whites
lead tomorrow.
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miners' canary's plight is not in vain if the miners observe that a danger
threatens them. The miners paid attention to the canary's plight and
heeded its warning, fleeing the dangerous gas. Similarly, those indirectly
affected by the suffering of the disempowered might not only perceive
such suffering but recognize its import for their own well-being.
Similarly, if those viewing the shocking mistreatment of transgendered
prisoners realize that these very dangers threaten their own well-being,
they might take broader action to remedy the problems.
At the beginning of this subsection I raised the specter of the
snuff film to highlight the ethical implications of spectatorship
presumed here. If the miners' canary metaphor is to be of value, the
observation of abject humiliation and suffering must entail the spec-
tator's empathy. The allegory's power is lost if the spectator merely
engages in yet another perverse, distanced consumption of another's
suffering, regardless of whether the pleasure of such spectatorship is
recognized. As the miner, observers of the transgendered prisoners'
suffering must create concern for oneself before danger is present.
That concern may lead majorities to examine the relevance of minori-
ties' suffering to their own lives.
B. The Wide Lens View: Learning From Transgendered Prisoners'Problems
The problems transgendered prisoners face by themselves merit
our attention as shocking systematic violations of basic human rights.
Instructed by the miners' canary allegory, drawing the lesson from
their problems requires some distillation of the issues raised within the
context of profoundly disadvantaged lives. As many and as intercon-
nected as their subordinate identities are, the aspect of transgendered
identity that binds them is gender. Their problems, as the miners' ca-
nary allegory illustrates, are not merely their own. They signal and
demonstrate broader societal failures to cope with gender diversity.
1. Lesson to the Miners: Beware the Gender Binarism
The traumas suffered by transgendered prisoners not only inform
but crystallize the gender conflicts that wrack our society. The visibil-
Beverly I. Moran & William Whitford, A Black Critique of the Internal Revenue Code,
1996 Wis. L.-Rav. 751, 802 n.176.
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ity of transgendered inmates within the corrections context can serve
to highlight problems that otherwise would not necessarily be visi-
ble.2s The placement dilemmas confronting prison authorities arise in
less blatant fashion throughout our lives, where individual's gender
identity renders everyday situations disadvantageous or even danger-
ous. Subordinations based on gender identity define myriad socio-
legal problems, including spousal and child abuse, rape, sexual har-
assment, employment discrimination, and economic inequality, since
gender identity is a fundamental aspect of one's identity-perhaps the
most fundamental given the legal coercion of individuals into one of the
two sexes, "male" or "female." Each of these problems entails elements
of the "compulsory gendering"-the forced adherence to the gender
binarism discussed in Part One. " [P]articipants in the legal system often
overlook the dynamic and synergistic relationship between law and gen-
der and the impact of such a relationship on the individual."
282
2. The Failure of Sex Discrimination Law
Sex discrimination law, centered in the doctrines of Title VII and
equal protection, not only fail to recognize gender diversity but rein-
force the gender binarism, even as they attempt to institute some form
of gender justice. In United States v. Virginia, the Supreme Court
ruled that the Virginia Military Institute (VMI), an all-male public
institution, would have to admit women. s3 In that case, the Court
enunciated the current, recently-elevated standard for equal protection
based on gender: "[f]ocihsing on the differential treatment or denial of
opportunity for which relief is sought, the reviewing court must deter-
mine whether the proferred justification is 'exceedingly persuasive.' ,214
The Court's decision in that case built upon the decision in J.E.B. v.
Alabama, in which the Court decided that jury strikes could not be
based solely on gender.2 " Both cases point to our country's "long and
281. See Sturm, Gladiators, supra note 278, at 126 ("Other signals of both problem and
progress are lacking. Often, problems only become visible when they converge
around a particular visible group. The presence of women enables observers to see.").
282. Levison & Francis, supra note 23, at 2.
283. SeeUnited States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 536 (1996).
284. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 532-33. My analysis of VMI relies on the work of Dan Levison
and Meredith Francis. See Levison & Francis, supra note 23, at 25-42; see also, J.E.B.
v. Alabama, 511 U.S. 127, 136 (1994) (noting the "gender-based classifications re-
quire 'an exceedingly persuasive justification.'") (citation omitted).
285. SeeJ.E.B., 511 U.S. at 141-42.
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unfortunate history of sex discrimination," including the denial of the
right to vote.285 One must not ignore the conservatism of an institu-
tion that grudgingly uses the word 'gender, or the Court's relatively
progressive stance in taking gender discrimination more seriously than
it has been taken in the past.288
However, the Court's attempts at attending to the social crises
arising from gender discord fall quite short of the reality of gender
diversity. I quote the Court's statement in the VMI case because it
reflects the predominant liberal notion of gender justice.
'Inherent differences' between men and women, we have
come to appreciate, remain cause for celebration, but not for
denigration of the members of either sex or for artificial con-
straints on an individual's opportunity. Sex classifications
may be used to compensate women 'for particular economic
disabilities [they have] suffered,' ... to advance full devel-
opment of the talent and capacities of our Nation's people.
But such classifications may not be used, as they once were,
to create or perpetuate the legal, social, and economic inferi-
ority of women. 2 9
The full force of the notion of two opposed sexes of 'men' and
'women,' the former oppressing the latter, is apparent here. The
Court views the male/female binarism as a discrete, never-
intermingled set of independent categories. The enunciation of the
gender binarism points to a reliance on the category of 'women' as the
unjustly subjugated, ignoring the broader phenomenon of gender, as
opposed to biological sex, oppression.
Title VII discussions point to a similar construct of gender iden-
tity based in the apparently simple but entirely mistaken notion of the
biological truth of two sexes. Title VII cases have generally rejected
286. J.EB., 511 U.S. at 136 (citation omitted).
287. Justice Scalia's dissent in J.E.B. sarcastically criticized the use of the word 'gender' in
the majority's decision, stating "[tioday's opinion is an inspiring demonstration of
how thoroughly up-to-date and right-thinking we Justices are in matters pertaining
to the sexes (or as the Court would have it, the genders), and how sternly we disap-
prove the male chauvinist attitudes of our predecessors." J.E.B., 511 U.S. at 156.
288. One blatant example of prior blindness to women's issues is Geduldig v. Aiello, 417
U.S. 484 (1974), in which the Court viewed pregnant women as a category unto it-
self, denying them the rights that would be given to them had they been considered
to belong to the category "women".
289. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 533-34 (citations omitted).
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claims of discrimination against a trarisgendered person as sex dis-
crimination.290 Sex discrimination involves a person who has been
mistreated based on that person's sex. However, in the hegemony of
the gender binarism, this notion of discrimination is reduced to
"discrimination against women because of their status as females and
discrimination against males because of their status as males."29 Kath-
erine Franke criticizes the notion that sex discrimination must be
centered on the biological.
To conceptualize both sexual identity and sex discrimination
in terms of biology at all is to ignore the role that gender
stereotypes play in the construction of sexual difference ...
bodies end up meaning less in the fight for equality than the
roles, clothing, myths, and stereotypes that transform a va-
gina into a she.292
Indeed, it is social position, not biology, that places women in the
workplace at risk of sexual harassment, and men against the some-
times-confining expectations of masculinity. 2 3 Title VII law prohibits
sex discrimination, including sexual harassment. However, many have
criticized the structure of sex discrimination law, not only for the
conflation of sex with gender, but for the construction of women as a
"protected" sex, a structure that ignores the relevance and complexity
of social positioning.
The widely-hailed Oncale24 case, in which the Supreme Court
recognized "same-sex harassment," 295 fails to escape the gender bi-
narism, with constant references to 'male' and 'female' categories as
uncomplicated ones. Justice Scalia reiterated the Harris v. Forklift296
formula that "[t]he critical issue, Tide VII's text indicates, is whether
members of one sex are exposed to disadvantageous terms or condi-
tions of employment to which members of the other sex are not
290. See Franke, supra note 1, at 31-35.
291. Wood v. C.G. Studios, Inc., 660 F. Supp. 176, 177 (E.D. Pa. 1987), quoted in
Franke, supra note 1, at 35.
292. Franke, supra note 1, at 39-40.
293. Katherine Franke refers to specific situations in which people may face treatment that
would be prohibited under a right to gender equality. See Franke, supra note 1, at 8.
294. See Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75 (1998).
295. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80.
296. SeeHarris v. Forklift, 510 U.S. 17 (1993).
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exposed." 29 Even where the Court fundamentally recognizes that the
male/female divide need not be bridged for a qualifying sexual harass-
ment claim, the Court relies on gender stereotypes: "[a] professional
football player's working environment is not severely or pervasively
abusive, for example, if the coach smacks him on the buttocks as he
heads onto the field .... ,298 Unsurprisingly, in this case involving
sexual harassment in the all-male context of an oil rig, the paradigm of
a "male" work environment, a football team, not only succumbs to
the notion that "men" have "masculine" jobs, but also fails to provide
much specific guidance for lower courts requiring guidance for their
consideration of more commonplace occupational situations. The re-
ality of men's lives thankfully lies far from the football field, and the
invocation of such stereotypes only serves to enforce compulsory par-
ticipation in the gender binarism.
Oncale represents yet another blow to the theory that expanded
rights for lesbian and gay people would sua sponte advance thinking on
gender rights.29 It proves the profound reliance on'gender stereotypes
in legal thinking, even when enunciating a rule inclusive of lesbians
and gay men.
Compulsory gendering restricts choice, and expression of
that choice, by policing gender identity through the use of
stereotypes. These stereotypes are simplified and shared im-
ages imbued with special meaning, and are the bases from
which conformity and nonconformity to the compulsory
gendering scheme is judged. When stereotypes describe the
imposition of certain characteristics on the sexes, they act as
a tool of compulsory gendering by describing who we are
and prescribing how we ought to be. °°
The stereotyping of gender identity in Oncale thus represents an-
other lost opportunity for the Court to move beyond the gender
binarism. The law of both equal protection and Tide VII enforce a
gender-rights doctrine that hews narrowly to a highly-traditional no-
297. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 80 (quoting Harris, 510 U.S. at 25).
298. Oncale, 523 U.S. at 81.
299. For a notable example of this thinking, see generally, Nan D. Hunter, Marriage,
Law, and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, 1 L. & SxupAtTy 9 (1991) (arguing that same-
sex marriage would denaturalize the patriarchal gender hierarchy of marriage).
300. Levison & Francis, supra note 23, at 9.
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tion of gender that relies more on stereotypes of who we are than the
realities of our lives. The miners' understanding necessarily points to a
remedy, as the miner will not observe the canary's plight without
leaving the mine. The observation of the problem thus directs the
miner towards the roads to its remedy. As Lani Guinier has stated,
"IT]he solution ... is not merely to fix the canary's respiratory sys-
tem, to fit the canary with a pint-sized gas mask, or to plead for
special canary rights but to clean the atmosphere that is poisoning us
all."3 ' Of course, cleaning toxic air might be a simpler goal than
remedying the flaws of the gender binarism posed by the treatment of
transgendered prisoners. However, Guinier's dichotomy between
band-aid reformist remedies and progressive broad change describes
solutions available in various social problems, including those sur-
rounding the issue of gender identity. Title VII and Equal Protection
doctrines might be viewed as "pint-sized gas masks," when what is
needed is a thorough cleansing of the air. Given the demonstrated
limitation of advocating within the available permutations of the
law's gender binarism, we need to look to a different idea for progress
on the gender troubles that plague our society, a right to gender
identity.
3. A Right to Gender Identity
Recall the opening paragraph of this Article in which a transgen-
dered woman suffers the physical and mental torture of losing her
gender identity as a result of her incarceration. Currently-accepted
Constitutional frameworks such as that set up by Turner v. Safley3. 2 or
even Farmer v. Brennan03 attempt to address the needs of these peo-
ple. Such solutions, however, may prove to be nothing more than
canary gas masks in the toxic air of the gender binarism, which permit
little accounting of the real situations facing transgendered or tradi-
tionally-gendered people. Clearing the air requires evoking a more
fundamental level of inquiry regarding gender relations in our society.
The right of gender identity is at the core of the issues facing trans-
gendered prisoners and all people who necessarily bear the burden of
the archaic gender binarism's grip.
301. Guinier & Sturm, TheMiners' Canary, supra note 280, at 1-2.
302. 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
303. 511 U.S. 825 (1994).
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Rather than accept further articulation of the rights of minorities
within the gender binarism, we must look behind current sex
discrimination and equal protection law for the lurking fundamental
right to gender identity, whose recognition would provide justice and
clarity to those laws. Legal analysis of contemporary law on gender re-
veals the necessity for a recognition of the right to the self-definition of
gender identity. A right to gender identity, as a broader interpretation
of Fourteenth Amendment anti-discrimination doctrine, would ad-
dress the claims of people subjected to compulsory gendering,
permitting them to define their own gender identity without fear of
discrimination in employment, housing, family, or other law. The
interpretation of sex discrimination laws must realize the underlying
fundamental right to determine gender without regard to sex.'04
This right asserts that an individual's gender should not be re-
stricted by physiological, genetic, or social gender identity. Many in
the transgender movement recognize that gender is essentially fluid:
All human beings carry within themselves an ever-
unfolding idea of who they are and what they are capable of
achieving.... It is fundamental that individuals have the
right to define, and to redefine as their lives unfold, their
own gender identities, without regard to chromosonal sex,
genitalia, assigned birth sex, or initial gender role.305
The claim here is for the highest possible liberty in defining one's own
gender identity, without regard to the traditionally-determinative
factors of biology and culture. This diversity, combined with the fact
that gender constitutes such a fundamental part of personal identity,
renders the right to gender identity an especially important one.
This notion of a fundamental right to gender identity has been
explored in depth by transgender activists, who have devised a set of
gender rights that express the full meaning of a right to gender iden-
tity. The International Bill of Gender Rights0 serves as a useful point
of reference for analysis of gender legal problems by pointing to po-
304. See, e.g., Franke, supra note 1, at 99.
305. The International Conference on Transgender Law and Employment Policy, Inc.,
The International Bill of Gender Rights 1 (adopted on June 17, 1995 in Houston, TX)
(visited Oct. 6, 1999) <http:/home.sol.no/-jane/tgbill.html> [hereinafter THE
INTERNATIONAL BILL OF GENDER RIGHTS].
306. THE INTERNATIONAL BILL OF GENDER RIGHTS, supra note 305.
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tential solutions. The theory of a highly fluid notion of gender un-
derlies the Bill.08 Gender is not bipolar; there are many genders,
perhaps as many as there are people.30 9 Although the nine specific
rights detailed in the Bill of Gender Rights outline the needs and goals
of transgendered people, they also serve as a blueprint for the legal
institution of a society free of gender-based oppression for all people.
The first and broadest is the right to define gender identity. This pro-
vision is the most fundamental departure from the prevailing norm,
which relies on biological indications to define gender. Individuals
deserve the right to "define their own gender identity regardless of
chromosomal sex, genitalia, assigned birth sex, or initial gender
role.. 3 0 No human or civil rights should be denied because of
someone's self-chosen gender identity.
The subsequently enumerated rights embellish the first right: the
choice of one's gender should come with all the commensurate social
approval that should follow from full acceptance of gender choice.
People should be able to freely express their gender identity, without
fear of discriminatory employment practices. Gender choice includes
the ability to control and change one's own body, cosmetically, hor-
monally, or surgically. One should be able to pursue a gender identity
with competent medical and professional care, although psychiatric
oversight should not be mandatory. The realization that gender is a
choice for one to make obviates the need for psychiatric and physical
evaluation to determine the merit of gender transformation. The right
to define one's gender fundamentally contradicts the "permission
granted" medicalization of transgenderism enunciated in dicta by the
307. The Bill of Gender Rights may be seen to ignore the contextual complexities of
transgendered lives in many ways. The inability of the construct of rights to address
such complexity has been explored generally by Critical Legal Scholars. See generally
Mark Tushner, An Essay on Rights, 62 Tax. L REv. 1363 (1984) (arguing that rights
inherently fail to achieve their claimed purpose). Transgendered people, like other
minorities, place a great deal of faith in the ability of such rights to remedy social and
legal inequities. In its scope, the International Bill of Transgender Rights reads more
as a plan of action rather than a set of rights to be enacted by a legislature. Whether
rights will actually make a difference is questionable given their record for other mi-
norities.
308. One example of this fluidity comes across in Kate Bornstein's discussion of virtual
gender "On some of the 'pay for play' public electronic bulletin boards ... there can
always be found men who are on-line as women. Similarly, I've known a few women
who've gone on-line as men." BoRsrIN, supra note 4, at 139.
309. See generally, STOLTENBERG, supra note 14 (arguing that sexual identity is entirely a
political and social construct).
310. THE INTERNATiONAL Biu. OF GENDER RIGHTS, supra note 305.
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Supreme Court's Farmer decision, that transsexualism is a medically
defined disease. Finally, individuals should be guaranteed the right to
sexual expression, and to form committed, loving relationships, to
enter into marriage, and to raise children, regardless of gender iden-
tity.
4. The Impact of the Right to Gender Identity
These rights clarify some of the directions the law can take to
remedy the subordination of and discrimination against transgendered
people. They permit us to imagine the appearance of fair treatment of
traditionally-gendered and transgendered people in the context of a
right to gender identity. The gender binarism would be discarded
along with the compulsory stereotyped gender roles it enforces, per-
mitting people to express the multiple aspects of their gender
identities without fear of reproach. Men would receive protection for
their gender identities even outside of oil rigs and football teams. All
aspects of gender choice, from wearing pants to taking maternity
leave, would be open to women. Discrimination against lesbians and
gay men, often centered in the gender binarism rather than homo-
phobia,3 would have a new enemy. Legal decision-makers would
have a more expansive yet accurate basis for challenging the range of
gender-related problems, from domestic abuse to employment dis-
crimination.
Returning to the subject of this study, the right to gender iden-
tity would fundamentally ameliorate the rights of transgendered
prisoners. This right, as an interpretation of Fourteenth Amendment
law, should extend to prisoners under Turner v. Safely, easily outpac-
ing current Eighth Amendment analysis that centers on the
medicalization of transgendered prisoners. The predominant method
of automatically placing transgendered people in prisons using genita-
lia as a litmus gender test clearly violates the right to define one's
gender. However important this right may be in addressing the needs
of transgender prisoners, the actualization of such a right in prison is
doubtful at best. Prison authorities function precisely to restrict choice
on the part of the prison population, and this denial of choice would
extend to self-definition of gender. A discrete right to gender identity
within the guarantee of equal protection would better address the
311. See supra Part I.A.3 (discussing of the conflation of gender and sexual orientation).
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concerns of transgendered people in and out of prison. The funda-
mental right to gender identity, like other rights enjoyed by people in
the free world, would necessarily undergo modification for its guar-
antee to prisoners, but would nonetheless provide a basis for
challenging discriminatory placement and treatment practices. With-
out the right to gender identity, serious change might prove elusive
for progressive individual actors in the corrections machine. Attorneys
may tinker with the current system of genitalia-based placement and
limited treatment to find piecemeal improvements. But the more
sweeping change provided by a right to gender identity would indu-
bitably serve the needs of all people, including transgendered
prisoners.
The reality is that such a right to gender identity may seem a pipe
dream, especially for prisoners governed by institutions designed to
deny choice. Yet San Francisco, the oft-harbinger of future legal pol-
icy, has included "gender identity" to its set of identities that may not
be the legal target of discrimination. 2 The progressively faster pace of
gender issues rising through the courts and legislatures will only serve
to make the need for a right to gender identity more evident.
Furthermore, examinations of rights victories, both for minorities
and for broader populations, have revealed the limitations of a rights
structure in guaranteeing progress. Indeed, some have argued that
rights are a distracting substitute for true progressive change.3 Criti-
cal race theorists in particular have reassessed presumed victories in
light of the failure of courtroom victories to translate into street-level
progress.3 " Given the recent reassessment of the value of legal victories
for queer communities,3 1 ' advocates for transgender rights might take
pause before pursuing an agenda that mimics traditional civil rights
structures. In advocating for a right to gender identity, we cannot for-
get that securing rights requires social, not just legal, change that
cleans the toxic air people breathe.
312. See CITY AND CouNTY OF S.F., CAL. ADMINISTRATV E CODE Ch. 12; see also,
CALIFIA, supra note 61, at 238.
313. See Tushnet, supra note 307.
314. See, e.g., Patricia J. Williams, Alchemical Notes: Reconstructing Ideals from Decon-
structed Rights, 22 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REa. 401,403-04 (1987).
315. See, e.g., Rosenblum, supra note 269, at 94-114.
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CONCLUSION
Today, "[f]rom being an art of unbearable sensations, punish-
ment has become an economy of suspended rights."316 This assessment
provides a transpicuously insightful presentation of the function of
prisons in contemporary society generally. Transgendered prisoners,
however, witness their suspended rights converted into the unbearable
sensations of their own coerced transmogrification. Transgendered
prisoners' position behind bars, underneath the weight of so much
oppression, makes their everyday survival a series of heroic acts, a
heroism that defines the transgender movement.
Mariposas en el Andamio, or "Butterflies on the Scaffold,""0
7
documents the story of a group of transgendered people in La Guin-
era, a rural Cuban town. Lacking access to the trappings of modern
femininity used for cross-dressing, they ingeniously invent these ele-
ments with the quotidian objects available. The drag queens confront
an atmosphere of utter ostracism, where their private performances
have been banned by the police. Despite her disapproval and miscom-
prehension of transgenderism, Fifi, La Guinera's Chief of
Construction, agrees to let the drag queens perform at the construc-
tion workers' cafeteria. Braving the town's machista element, they
perform, proudly claiming their transgendered identity, and their
spiritedness wins the ultimate transformation of the townspeople's
intolerance into support. Fifi confirms the town's conversion, stating
she believes it is essential for children to be exposed to transgendered
people to open their minds about who they want to be, and that
transvestitism is at the heart of the revolution.'18 These transgendered
people helped liberate the town from the gender binarism.
The maze of barricades transgendered people must delve through
and surmount, from La Guiniera, Cuba to United States prisons, alert
us to the urgency of the gender binarism's crippling constraints on
human expression. Yet as the transgendered people of La Guinera in-
spired the townspeople, envisioning fair treatment of transgendered
people directs us toward the liberation of people of all genders. In
rallying for the fair treatment of transgendered people, we speed the
316. MICHEL FOUCAULT, DISCIPLINE AND PUNISH 11 (1977).
317. MARPosAs EN EL-ANDAMIO (Luis Felipe Bernaza & Margaret Gelpin 1995).
318. Fifi, Chief of Construction, La Guinera, quoted in MARIPOSAS EN EL ANDAmIo, supra
note 317.
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decline of compulsory gendering as we advance the establishment of
gender justice and freedom for all. This is the unimpeachable trans-
gendered ethic, as a family doctor in La Guinera recognized, stating,
"the trans[gender] phenomenon is a new era with perspectives for the
union of humanity in love and mutual respect between human be-
ings." 319t
319. Dr. Jorge Fidel Moreno, quoted in MAmpOSAS EN EL ANDAMIO, supra note 317.
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